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A. Streetlights and Shadows
This article addresses the cognitive obstacles to, and opportunities for, police
getting the individualized suspicion judgment right.' This article makes a simple
assumption: people suffer and benefit from certain common ways of thinking, and
police are people too.2 Granted, police have the benefit of certain experience,
training, and resulting intuitions about how to do their jobs that laypersons lack.
But that is true of people in most employment-related roles, and even people with
expertise in a subject-matter area, that is, people with trained intuition, make
common mistakes.4 Gary Klein, a senior scientist at Applied Research Associates,
begins his book on practical decision making with the following story that
illuminates the nature of all expert decision making:
A policeman saw a drunk searching for something under a
streetlight. "What have you lost, my friend?" the policeman asked. "My
keys,["] said the drunk. The policeman then helped the drunk look and
finally asked him: "Where exactly did you drop them?" "Over there,"
responded the drunk, pointing toward a dark alley. The policeman then
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See infra text accompanying note 208.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 223-34.
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asked: "Why are you looking here?" The drunk immediately replied:
"Because the light is so much brighter here."5
For Klein, this story is a metaphor for human decision making. The light-
revealing color and great detail-shines on those aspects of a problem that are
clear.6 We see the light through one visual structure: the cones in our eyes.7 We
address those clearly illuminated aspects of a problem, says Klein, with an
associated way of thinking, namely, conscious, rational, systematic thought.
But the cones are useless in darkness, which represents, in the story,
ambiguity-something that humans dread.9 We need a different visual structure,
namely rods, to see in the dark, and the cognitive structure in Klein's tale that is
associated with the rods is our subconscious mind.' 0
Yet real problems have aspects of clarity and ambiguity about them."
Solutions therefore lie at the intersection of streetlights and shadows, of the
conscious and subconscious minds. 2
The topic of this article is a subset, a corner, of the intersection of streetlights
and shadows. But on this corner, the roles of drunk and policeman are reversed.
My interest is in exploring what, at least partly, subconscious habits of thinking
stand in the way of, or help to promote, police accuracy in making searches and
decisions. More specifically, I want to examine what psychological forces may
5 GARY KILEIN, STREETLIGHTS AND SHADOwS: SEARCHING FOR THE KEYS TO ADAPTIVE
DECISION MAKING xiii (2009).
6 See id. at 5.
See id. at 5-6; GARY H. CASSEL ET AL., THE EYE BOOK: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO EYE
DISORDERS AND HEALTH 193-94 (1998) (explaining the role of cones in the biology of sight).
8 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 6.
' See id.
10 See id at 93; CASSEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 193 (explaining the role of rods in the biology
of sight). Seeing in the dark, as Klein also notes, requires viewing objects at an angle, rather than
head-on, as the latter perspective would focus light on the near-useless-in-the-dark, cone-rich, central
retina. See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 6.
1I See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 60-61.
12 See id at 80-82. It is an oversimplification of modem cognitive science to speak of the
conscious and subconscious minds as a dichotomy. Rather, humans have a range of mental states
lying on a continuum ranging from less to more conscious. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz,
Forgetting Freud: The Courts' Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 16 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 169-78 (2007) (explaining all these points). Moreover, the varying degrees of
consciousness and unconsciousness interact with one another. See id. Furthermore, most conscious
thought has its origins in the subconscious. See id. at 171. Additionally, some of the less-conscious
portions of the mind can be made accessible to consciousness, and conscious action can often work to
change those portions of the unconscious mind not readily accessible to the conscious. See id. at 176,
178. Nevertheless, the conscious/unconscious distinction is a useful simplifying idea, the
unconscious being largely governed by rapid, categorical reasoning, the conscious mind being
slower, but often capable of more flexible reasoning. See id. at 169-78. In some contexts, the more
realistic spectrum description of the mind would be essential. But for my purposes here, that
description would simply add unnecessary and obfuscating ambiguity.
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lead police to err in deciding that there is reasonable suspicion to stop or frisk, or
probable cause to search or arrest. But I also want to consider what psychological
forces may help to improve police choices in this area. Understanding these forces
should enable us to encourage more improvement than decay.
At the heart of both reasonable suspicion and probable cause is their shared
commitment to particularized judgments-to judging the individual's likely guilt
or innocence based primarily upon his own actions, beliefs, and character.
Stereotype, surmise, or even informed guess should play no role in this judgment.'3
Mistakes in making this particularized judgment are thus at the heart of my paper
as well.
B. Fourth Amendment Error
"Error" can occur in at least two ways: first, by catching the guilty by pure
luck rather than by the reasoned, individualized decision-making process that the
Constitution commands; and, second, by searching or seizing individuals who are
innocent of any crime, or at least who are not in possession of any evidence of
crime, at the time of a search. 14 In theory, the former error is harder to measure
than is the latter,' 5 though the effort to gauge the impact of either with any
specificity is also too rarely made. 16
Yet neither type of error is improbable, nor are the costs of a mistake
insignificant. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, at least generally presumes that
13 See Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs,
Benefits, and Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 1-3) (on file with Law and Contemp. Probs.) (defining "individualized suspicion,"
defending the concept against critics' contentions that it describes something that cannot exist, and
cataloguing the social benefits and costs of embracing a robust version of the concept in Fourth
Amendment reasonable suspicion and probable cause decisions).
14 Cf BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE: NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES 3-4 (2004)
(defining "errors ofjustice" as occurring "either when an innocent person ... is harassed, detained or
sanctioned, or when a culpable offender receives a sanction that is either more or less than optimal-
one that minimizes social cost--or escapes sanctioning altogether," and comparing that sort of error
with the more traditional lawyers' idea of justice errors as "errors in the interpretation, procedure, or
execution of the law-typically, errors that violate due process"); Steven Penrod, Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: How Well Are Witnesses and Police Performing?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 37, 40-45
(2003) (addressing the cost of relying on mere "lucky guesses" of a suspect's identity in the area of
eyewitness identification).
1 This is because in the most easily measurable event-catching a guilty person-a correct
outcome occurs but via a flawed process, with the process harder to measure than the outcome.
Furthermore, individuals have a hard time recognizing when good outcomes result from good luck,
being more willing to attribute those outcomes to the individuals' superior performance. See infra
text accompanying notes 328-32.
16 At least this effort is too rarely made in the area of search and seizure, in which I know of
few serious empirical studies of these sorts of error rates and no theoretico-empirical efforts at
synthesis of likely contributors to errors of the sort I conduct here.
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traditional criminal searches and seizures made without particularized suspicion do
violence to fundamental constitutional values.17 We must catch the bad guys, but
we must do so in the right way: by invading core protections of privacy, property,
and free movement only when we have ample justification, rooted in reasonably
solid evidence, that a particular person's wrongdoing has occurred or that evidence
of it will be found.'8 Any other presumption undermines values central to selfhood
and to the dissent, diversity, and security of personality and of ideas that are
essential to a free people.19 The Fourth Amendment thus seems most overtly
concerned with the first type of error: avoiding catching the bad guy by the lucky
guess rather than the informed choice.
But the second type of error-the unknowingly often wrong (the unlucky)
guess-cannot be ignored either. The Fourth Amendment's fundamental
command is that all searches and seizures be "reasonable."2 0 What is reasonable
turns on a weighing of state crime-control interests against individual and
community interests.21 Any concept of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that
tolerates massive false negative rates-frequent invasions of privacy, property, and
locomotive rights that ensnare the apparently innocent-is a flawed conception.
The costs imposed on communities and individuals become great, while little in
the way of crime-control efforts is achieved.22 There is thus too little "bang for the
buck" spent on aggressive policing.
For example, in 2006 alone the New York City Police Department [NYPD]
made 508,540 stops or stop-and-frisks, a 500% increase over those made during
the preceding year.23 Yet in only 10% of these cases did police make arrests or
issue summonses, an apparent error rate of the second type of 90%.24 (There may
be high error rates of the first type too, that is, simply ignoring constitutional
processes, but no precise numerical data are available on this point). There also
seems to be significant error in the reliance police place on race as an indicator of
" See ANDREW E. TASLITZ ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 96-97 (3d ed.
2007).
18 See id.
19 See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868, 88-89 (2006) (discussing peoplehood and the free speech/Fourth
Amendment connection).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 175-76.
22 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 23-26).
23 Marc Krupanski et al., Backgrounder on Racial Profiling and Police Brutality Against
People of Color in New York City, Prepared for the Special Rapporteur on Racism on the Occasion
offHis 2008 Mission to the U.S., 1 (2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR PolicingUNSR.pdf; Press
Release, American Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Says New NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Database Raises
Major Privacy Concerns (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice prisoners-rights-drug-
law-reform immigrants-rights/nyclu-says-new-nypd-stop-and-frisk.
24 Krupanski et al., supra note 23, at 1; GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN
THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 43 (2007).
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suspicion. Of those persons stopped by the NYPD in 2006, 45% of Blacks and
Latinos were also frisked, compared to only 29% of Whites, "even though [W]hite
suspects were 70% more likely than Black suspects to have a weapon." 25 These
statistics reveal the lucky ones, the ones who were apparently released from police
custody once error was found, suffering "only" the harm of needless humiliation.26
But on other occasions, police have relied on a combination of questionable
information sources to make arrests and viewed crime through police tunnel vision,
resulting in convicting persons who were later shown to be entirely innocent of
crime, a result whose probability is again likely magnified where the arrestee is a
member of certain minority racial or ethnic groups.27
These two types of errors may, of course, also be related-the failure to
follow sufficiently robust constitutional procedures not only unjustifiably
infringing upon privacy and related rights but also increasing the likelihood of
humiliating or, still worse, convicting, the innocent. 28 The analysis to come will
indeed suggest that this connection is a plausible one.29
It must not be forgotten, however, that it is not only the innocent who suffer
from mistakes. Every innocent person stopped, arrested, or even convicted based
upon flawed procedures may mean a guilty man roaming free, his wrong
unpunished, perhaps to offend again. 30 Repeated police errors can also undermine
public trust, leading citizens to avoid reporting crimes, sharing information with
law enforcement, or cooperating with police requests. In the long run, all these
consequences can increase overall crime and decrease capture rates for the guilty.31
Furthermore, even when police are correct in individual cases, if their overall
error rate is high, justified prosecutions occur at an unduly high cost in police time
and resources.3 2 If error rates can be brought down, police may catch more
lawbreakers for a given amount of effort-an efficiency to be desired in purely
25 Krupanski et al., supra note 23, at 2; RIDGEWAY, supra note 24, at xi.
26 See DALE C. CARSON & WES DENHAM, ARREST-PROOF YOURSELF 174 (2007) ("Being
questioned by police is insulting. It makes you feel violated and used. It is, however, less insulting
than being arrested.").
27 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting the
Innocent: The Informants Example, 37 Sw. U. L. REV. 1091, 1113-19 (2008).
28 See id. at 1107-08 (analyzing risks of convicting the innocent); Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect
and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 94-95 (2003) (analyzing risks of
humiliation).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 170-77.
30 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, ACHIEVING JUSTICE:
FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY: REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION'S
AD Hoc INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (2006).
31 See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 117-
28 (2002); Taslitz, supra note 28, at 22-25.
32 See FORST, supra note 14, at 45-56, 66-111 (analyzing criminal justice error costs
generally and policing costs specifically); HARRIS, supra note 31, at 73-87 (analyzing data on racial
profiling costs).
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monetary terms, especially in a time of tight police budgets. In addition, lower
error rates are both politically and morally desirable. Lower error rates may
therefore promise more, not less, effective crime control.
C. Error Reduction and the Duties to Investigate, Evaluate, and Report
Until now, I have talked about police errors in individualized judgments as
subdividing into two further types of errors-unwarranted privacy and related
invasions of rights and failure to uncover evidence of crime. But, correspondingly,
the individualized judgment mandate may make these two types of errors
themselves less likely if the mandate is taken seriously. More investigation is
required to be able to point to evidence that this person has done wrong than to
34
show that he fits into a group or a stereotype that is assumed to have done wrong.
At a certain point, however, further investigation likely increases the chances of
both types of error, but, I will argue here, that saturation point is unlikely to be
reached in the typical reasonable suspicion or probable cause decision.35
A particularized inquiry requirement thus also boils down to a duty to
investigate-a duty recognized in some case law-and to related duties to evaluate
the evidence carefully before acting and to articulate clear justifications for action
to third parties, such as police superiors, the judiciary, and the general public.
Particularized inquiry, properly understood, thus serves goals of accountability and
transparency, goals of independent value, which may themselves spur self-
corrective mechanisms that further reduce the risk of error.
My position here flies in the face of a growing academic movement that
valorizes police hunches and intuitive decision making over articulable bases, sees
them as being beyond third parties' understanding, and therefore counsels
increasing deference to police judgment.38 That movement, I argue, is not so much
wrong as it unwisely displays but one portion of a much more complex picture.
3 See FORST, supra note 14, at 71-73, 109-11.
34 See infra text accompanying notes 128-30.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 255-481.
36 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1993) (discussing the value of, and depth of
information required by, individualizing or particularizing justice); infra text accompanying notes
482-505 (discussing case law on the duty to investigate and the duty's roots in the Fourth
Amendment's common particularized inquiry requirement).
3 See Taslitz, supra note 36, at 22-24.
38 See, e.g., Fabio Arcila, Jr., In the Trenches: Searches and the Misunderstood Common-Law
History of Suspicion and Probable Cause, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2007) (arguing that the Framers
intended that judges issuing warrants defer to police conclusions about the existence of probable
cause); Craig S. Lerner, An Introduction to Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1 (2007); Craig S.
Lerner, Judges Policing Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & PoL'Y 25 (2007); Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable
Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REv. 405 (2006) [hereinafter Lerner, Reasonable
Suspicion] (policy argument).
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Hunches and intuition have their place. But if they replace rather than complement
more conscious, systematic thinking, they leave us in the dark with no hope of
finding the light. 9
This piece ends with some recommendations for change, but they are broad
admonitions and only tentative recommendations because my focus here is
primarily on the competency of police, acting as individuals and as an institution,
in minimizing error in making the individualized suspicion judgment.4 0 A fuller
account of institutional change would require a comparative institutional analysis
exploring the relative competency of the judiciary, the legislature, administrative
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the people as alternative or
supplementary institutions contributing to error reduction. 41 I do touch briefly on
several of these other institutions, but primarily to explore how they do, or may,
under current or other institutional arrangements, affect police behavior. I do not
pretend to offer here a more comprehensive analysis of any of these institutions in
themselves or as they interact with other governing bodies. In other words, a
thorough, comparative institutional analysis would have to show that judges,
legislators, or other institutions, though flawed, are less flawed than police in
making these decisions.4 2 That task I do not attempt here.
Finally, my emphasis is primarily on the often rapid decisions of police on the
beat because they account for the vast bulk of searches, seizures, stops, and arrests
in the United States.4 3 I compare their decisions to the somewhat more leisurely
work of detectives seeking warrants and, to a still lesser degree, to federal law
enforcement officers." My analysis has relevance to all these groups, but, given
their predominance, my place of departure is the street cops. It is in their hands
that most of our Fourth Amendment freedoms lie.
D. The Lay of the Land
After this Introduction, Part II summarizes research on how people and police
make judgments based upon their first impressions of others' activities and nature.
Part II addresses such matters as individual differences in ability to make accurate
first impressions, the role of biases based upon facial features, the fundamental
3 See infra Part III.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 428-33.
41 Cf NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the importance of, and engaging in an
extended analysis of, comparative institutional competence analysis to choose among imperfect
alternatives).
42 Cf id. at 147-49 (analyzing the importance of identifying the least flawed institution). A
more thorough comparative institutional analysis is a task I undertake in a series of follow-up, in-
progress articles.
43 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 61 (patrol officers, not detectives, do most of the
arresting).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 399-401, 425-28.
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attribution error, the problem of "cognitive load," empathy reduction, and police
resistance to changing first impressions even when faced with countervailing
evidence.45
Part IIIA seeks to balance the scales by examining the virtues of police
intuition and experience. These virtues include: avoiding rigid, mechanical
thinking; preventing complacency; spotting behavioral patterns; recognizing
anomalies; generating new ideas; and evoking stories that bring rich context to an
otherwise unduly narrow focus on an arbitrarily small set of determinative
factors.46
Part IIB is an initial attempt at a cost-benefit analysis that seeks ways to
marry the virtues, and divorce the vices, of each way of thinking (intuitive and
systematic) into a more harmonious matrimonial whole. To do so, Part IIIB
further elaborates on some of the costs and benefits of cognitive streetlights and
shadows. Part IIIB has separate sections addressing heuristics (cognitive
shortcuts); when and why formal ways of thinking outperform intuitive ones; how
intuition can lead to imagination, which can lead to more systematic thinking; the
importance of being aware of situational factors that can skew one's perceptions;
and the cognitive and political benefits of a requirement that police identify
"specific, articulable facts" justifying their judgments.4 7
Each of these sections suggests advantages for a modest duty to investigate,
supplemented by duties of making reasonable evaluation efforts once sufficient
information is gathered and of rendering reasonable reports expressly explaining
officers' reasons for actions taken. These duties are the subject of Part IV.48
Part V, the conclusion, summarizes the preceding arguments, makes tentative
recommendations for change, and urges the continuing advantages in future work
on policing in recognizing that police are indeed people too.4 9
II. THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF FIRST IMPRESSIONS
Any discussion of first impressions must begin with Malcolm Gladwell's
best-selling book, Blink.50  Blink popularized the idea that our intuitive, quick,
unconscious judgments are often right-indeed more accurate than many of our
conscious, deliberate judgments.5' That argument, made primarily via anecdote,
45 See infra text accompanying notes 50-183.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 209-54.
47 See infra text accompanying notes 255-481.
48 See infra text accompanying notes 482-548.
49 See infra Part V.
so MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2005).
s' See Eric Freeman, Book Review: Malcolm Gladwell's Blink, CREATING PASSIONATE USERs (Jan. 27,
2005), http://www.headnushtpepadcom/creatingpassionate users/2005/01/book review-mal.html ("This
time around Gladwell's basic thesis is that often snap [Judgments] ... can be more accurate than well
researched, careful analysis.").
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was the spin used to sell his book, a marketing effort that ignored Gladwell's
caution that the quick, intuitive route to truth is also often wrong and that it can be
difficult to ascertain in any particular case whether one's intuition is trustworthy or
flawed.
Nevertheless, some well-respected academics have extended Gladwell's
reasoning to policing. These academics argue that courts should give police
"hunches" more deference, for "gut" police reactions will be more accurate than
ones made during lengthier deliberations. 54 But this approach ignores the many
risks of error in making judgments based on first impressions, which is the
situation facing most police; the difficulty of telling when "hunches" are in error
and when not; and the constitutional mandate of the Fourth Amendment to limit
police discretion rather than blindly defer to it.55 This section focuses on nine
sources of error in police first impressions of potential suspects: individual
variability in the skill of making such judgments accurately, the fundamental
attribution error, the influence of facial features on personality judgments,
egocentrism, self-fulfilling prophecies, weak motivation to be accurate, cognitive
load, weak ability to effectively distinguish truth from lies, and resistance to
admitting a mistake. This section concludes with a first look at how a robust
individualized suspicion mandate can, at the same time, help to reduce or correct
the bad influence of these sources of error.
A. People Vary in Unpredictable Ways in Their Ability to Make Accurate First
Impressions
It is true that some people are, at times, reasonably good at making certain
judgments based on first impressions.6 But they are also often quite bad at doing
so.
57 Moreover, first impressions can involve at least five major attributes, namely,
52 See GLADWELL, supra note 50, at book jacket.
53 GLADWELL, supra note 50, at 130-38, 194-96.
54 See Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 38, at 407-18.
5s See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 201 (1993) ("The constitutional lodestar for understanding the Fourth Amendment is not
an ad hoc reasonableness standard; rather, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust
of police power and discretion."); Nathan H. Seltzer, When History Matters Not: The Fourth
Amendment in the Age of the Secret Search, 40 CRIM. L. BULL. 103, 120 (2004) ("The Framers[']
distrust of police discretion stemmed from fear of an overly powerful central government."); infra
text accompanying notes 67-160 (analyzing risks of error in making first impressions); infra text
accompanying notes 194-95 (discussing difficulty of identifying when hunches are mistaken).
56 See generally Judith A. Hall & Susan A. Andrzejewski, Who Draws Accurate First
Impressions?: Personal Correlates ofSensitivity to Nonverbal Cues, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS 87 (Nalini
Ambady & John J. Skowronski eds., 2008). "Accuracy" here is defined as the degree to which
correct judgments exceed chance. See id. at 89.
5 Heather M. Gray, To What Extent, and Under What Conditions, Are First Impressions
Valid?, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at 106, 107 ("[S]ome scholars point to common errors
in social judgment and conclude that, overall, first impressions are generally inaccurate."). Gray
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the subject's emotions, personality, intelligence, mental states, and use of
deception." Although there is some disagreement on the point, most researchers
believe that individuals vary in their ability to make accurate judgments based
upon first impressions.59 Yet there are low correlations between a person's ability
to judge one domain accurately and his ability to do so regarding another domain.o
Thus, a person good at judging others' mental states may be poor at judging
their personalities.6 1 But both these and other factors are relevant to police judging
whether a crime has occurred or is impending. 62 In addition, individuals' self-
knowledge about the relative degree of accuracy of their ability to make judgments
concerning each of the five major attributes upon first impression is also poor.6 3
points out, however, that mistaken first impressions are sometimes socially beneficial, certain
delusions or errors promoting better emotional adjustment and life satisfaction. See id. Gray also
argues that global accuracy statements are hard to make because both situational and dispositional
factors, the former being particularly subject to variation, play a role. See id. Gray's conclusion is
this: "In sum, first impressions are sometimes accurate and sometimes inaccurate. Accuracy depends
partly on the construct being judged, partly on the information available to the perceiver, partly on
the perceiver's motivation and ability to understand others, and partly on a host of other factors not
covered in this review." Id at 122.
" See id. at 107.
5 See Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 91.
60 See id.; Judith A. Hall, The PONS Test and the Psychometric Approach to Measuring
Interpersonal Sensitivity, in INTERPERSONAL SENSYTIViTY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 143, 143-58
(Judith A. Hall & Frank J. Bernieri eds., 2001).
61 Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 91. Concerning personality, it is worth noting that,
where subjects are not dissembling, many observers can, under appropriate circumstances, make
reasonably accurate judgments about certain personality traits, such as extraversion, upon first
impression, while other traits, such as neuroticism or openness, are harder to judge accurately in most
situations. Gray, supra note 57, at 110. Furthermore, there is some evidence that, as to personality
traits, "gut" reactions can sometimes be more accurate than deliberation for making personality
judgments based on minimal information. Id. at 111; Nalini Ambady, The Perils of Pondering:
Intuition and Thin Slice Judgments, 21 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2010) (constituting one of
the few, perhaps the only, study on this question). On the other hand, "with increasing acquaintance
comes increasing accuracy-at least when self-assessments are used as the gold standard," Gray,
supra note 57, at 110, a result probably stemming "from increased exposure to the target person in a
range of diverse environments." Id. Importantly, as well, the absence of dissembling cannot readily
be assumed, particularly in police-citizen interactions, and most people are simply not very good lie
detectors. Id. at 116.
62 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 185-226; Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 48-
52) (illustrating some of the sorts of factors police and courts may rely on in establishing probable
cause).
63 Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 96 ("Unfortunately, self-insight into AFI [accuracy
of first impressions] is relatively weak."); Judith A. Hall et al., Psychosocial Correlates of
Interpersonal Sensitivity: A Meta-Analysis, 33 J. NONVERBAL BEHAv. 149, 149 (2009); Ronald E.
Riggio & Heidi R. Riggio, Self-Report Measurement of Interpersonal Sensitivity, in INTERPERSONAL
SENSITIVITY: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT, supra note 60, at 127-40. Hall and Andrzejewski explain
this lack of self-insight thus:
Why self-insight for this skill is only mediocre is an interesting question. Perhaps
in real life, people do not get enough timely feedback on their AFI to develop accurate
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People generally, and police specifically, have confidence in their abilities to judge
others that is often undeserved, and they are unlikely to see themselves as worse
judges than their compatriots.64 Furthermore, even people shown to be good at
having some accurate initial impressions are accurate only when their targets are
telling the truth.65 Perceivers' accuracy plummets when targets lie.6
Why, then, are people, including police, so often bad and inconsistent in
judging others' thoughts, likely actions, personalities, and use of deception? This
subject occupies most of the remainder of this section.
B. Some Major Causes of Inaccurate First Impressions
1. The Fundamental Attribution Error
There are a number of likely reasons for high inaccuracy rates in making
judgments based upon first impressions. Among the most important of these
reasons is the "fundamental attribution error."68  This error is the tendency,
especially in American culture, to judge an individual's actions as stemming from
fundamental personality traits rather than from the situation in which she finds
herself.69 Moreover, people are willing to make quick and confident judgments of
a subject's personality trait based on a very limited data sample. 70 They will also
self-awareness. Perhaps much of this phenomenon is due to those at the lower end of
measured AFI, as these individuals should, by definition, lack insight into how well they
can judge others and they may not be able to make good use of others' feedback.
Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 96. Higher actual (as opposed to perceived) AFI is associated
with, among other factors, popularity, openness to new experiences, conscientiousness, a higher need
for social belonging, greater compassion, higher social class, and lower racial or ethnic prejudice. Id.
at 93-98.
6 Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 95-96 (people generally have poor self-insight into
their AFI); see infra text accompanying notes 328-36 (analyzing how overconfidence generally,
including by the police, is common and distorts judgment).
65 Gray, supra note 57, at 115-18.
66 Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 147-60.
67 See generally Gray, supra note 57, at 106-22 (summarizing many of these factors).
1 See id. at 107.
69 Id. (defining "fundamental attribution error"); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 173, 173-214 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977) (outlining a more detailed explanation of
the fundamental attribution error); LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE
SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (summarizing and explaining the
significance of the key research concerning this error); RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF
THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY ... AND WHY 123-27, 135, 207-08,
(2003) (noting that, though the fundamental attribution error has a grip on human thought in both
cultures, its grip is much firmer in Western than Asian cultures).
70 Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 7 CARDozo PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 121, 172 (2008) (describing the
fundamental attribution error as partly involving "our willingness to make confident and global
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overgeneralize, treating one perceived negative personality trait as indicative of an
overall negative personality across many criteria.
Many early judgments of this kind are based on facial expressions. 7 2  if,
therefore, someone in a rush believes that he has been unjustly stopped by the
police, the stopee may react with an angry or irritated scowl.73 There is a good
chance that the officer will interpret the person stopped as being "unsociable,
unfriendly, unsympathetic, cold, [and] forceful."74 These traits may lead the
officer to dislike the person stopped and to suspect him of wrongdoing.
2. Facial Type
Familiarity with facial types also affects personality judgments.7 6 Persons
living in racially segregated neighborhoods are likely less familiar with the faces of
character judgments about others-even those others very different from ourselves-based upon very
limited evidence").
71 Taslitz, supra note 12, at 184 ("Moreover, because of the 'devil's horn' and 'halo effects,'
evidence of a bad or good character trait may be understood as marking a person's entire personality
as bad or good."). Race can magnify the problem. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social
Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 180 (2007)
(describing the "ultimate attribution error" as the tendency to view out-group members in particularly
stereotypical ways).
72 Leslie A. Zebrowitz & Joann M. Montepare, First Impressions from Facial Appearance
Cues, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at 171, 183-84.
73 Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1117-18.
74 Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 72, at 184 ("Thus, an angry person may be viewed not
only as likely to act momentarily in an unaffiliative or dominant way but also as possessing enduring
low affiliative or high dominant traits (e.g., being unsociable, unfriendly, unsympathetic, cold,
forceful).").
75 See Paul F. Secord, Facial Features and Inference Processes in Interpersonal Perception,
in PERSON PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 300, 306-08 (Renato Tagiuri & Luigi Petrullo
eds., 1958) (describing the process of "temporal extension" in which "the perceiver regards a
momentary characteristic of the person as if it were an enduring attribute"); Zebrowitz & Montepare,
supra note 72, at 184 (noting the continuing modern relevance of Secord's "temporal extension"
idea); Taslitz, supra note 27 at 1109-12 (making a similar point about facial anger or resentment, but
combined with racialized perceptions and using the language of the fundamental attribution error).
76 Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 72, at 188-89 (describing the "familiar face
overgeneralization (FF0) hypothesis, which holds that perceived familiarity as well as actual
familiarity can influence impressions of faces"). The FFO hypothesis argues that we react to
strangers upon initial contact based upon their resemblance to known individuals. Id. at 188; see
generally Leslie A. Zebrowitz, Physical Appearance as a Basis ofStereotyping, in STEREOTYPES AND
STEREOTYPING 79 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996); LESLIE A. ZEBROWITz, READING FACES:
WINDOW TO THE SOUL? (1997). For example, peers were deemed more trustworthy when their photos
were morphed to look more like the perceiver, people preferred job candidates whose faces
resembled those of persons who had treated the perceiver kindly, and students expected more fairness
from a professor whose face resembled the prototypical face of other professors known to be fair.
Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 72, at 188.
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other racial groups.n That lack of familiarity leads to a dislike of those faces
relative to in-group faces. In particular, various studies have shown that Whites
react more negatively to "Afrocentric" faces (those displaying features
stereotypically associated with African-Americans) than to non-Afrocentric
faces.79
These facial biases can likewise bias memory and narrative creation.o One
study illustrating this point showed experimental subjects four versions of a story
embedded with a composite photograph of a Black male.8' The stories varied in
the degree of "stereotypic association with Blacks and whether or not it described a
crime."82 Subjects were then asked to use a computer program to reproduce the
face of the Black male in the story of interest, varying such things as nose, mouth,
and skin tone.83 The composite photograph in each story had been crafted to be at
the midpoint of the Afrocentric/Eurocentric features continuum. 8
Subjects who read stories about crime constructed faces that were far more
Afrocentric than the original face shown in the photograph.8 ' By contrast, subjects
n Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 72, at 188-89 (making this point and noting its
consistency with research showing that "people prefer faces that have become familiar through
repeated exposure" and that "the enhanced liking of known faces that results from exposure can
generalize to similar-looking strangers").
78 See, e.g., Yair Bar-Haim et al., Nature and Nurture in Own-Race Face Processing, 17
PSYCHOL. SC. 159, 159 (2006) (showing that even three-month-old infants had a visual preference
for own-race faces, though only if the infants lived in racially-segregated areas); Leslie A. Zebrowitz
et al., The Contribution of Face Familiarity to Ingroup Favoritism and Stereotyping, 25 Soc.
COGNITION 306, 306 (2007) (demonstrating that the average familiarity of face-raters with a given
race contributed to in-group favoritism and racial stereotyping). These own-race biases where
familiarity with other-race faces is low were found among Korean-Americans and African-Americans
as well as Whites. See Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 72, at 189. Facial familiarity can reduce
the effects of negative racial stereotypes and increase the effect of positive ones. Id.
7 See, e.g., Irene V. Blair et al., The Role of Afrocentric Features in Person Perception:
Judging by Features and Categories, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (2002); Jennifer L.
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004); Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really
Priming?: Cue-Based Versus Category-Based Processing of Facial Stimuli, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (2002); Keith B. Maddox, Perspectives on Racial Phenotypicalty Bias, 8
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 383, 383 (2004).
80 Keith B. Maddox & Kristin N. Dukes, Social Categorization and Beyond: How Facial
Features Impact Social Judgment, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at 205, 224-25.
81 Mary Beth Oliver et al., The Face of Crime: Viewers' Memory of Race-Related Facial
Features ofIndividuals Pictured in the News, 54 J. CoMM. 88, 88 (2004).
82 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 224-25 (describing the Oliver, Jackson, Moses, and
Dangerfield study).
83 Id. at 225; Oliver et al., supra note 81, at 95-97.
8 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 225; Oliver et al., supra note 81, at 97-98.
85 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 225; Oliver et al., supra note 81, at 98-99.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
who read non-crime stories did not construct faces that were more Afrocentric than
86the original, no matter how racially "stereotypic" the stories were.
In addition to this association between racialized facial phenotypic features
and crime, culture also plays a role. Persons from different subcultures often
misperceive the meaning of one another's facial expressions." Moreover,
individual perceivers differ in the degree to which they make and rely upon
89stereotypes.
Police are subject to the same influences. 90 In one particularly fascinating
study, a majority White sample of police officers was primed with either crime- or
non-crime-related words during a talk.9' They were then presented for a brief
period of time with a series of photos, each in a pair including one Black and one
White photograph, facing side by side.92 Next, the officers were asked whether
they recognized any faces in two lineups, one with Black faces, one with White, as
from the original photo series.93 In each lineup, only one face from the earlier
photo-series-examination task (the target) was used. 94  The target face was
accompanied by four distracters, two with faces more racially stereotypical than the
target's face, two with faces less racially stereotypical. 95  Here is how two
commentators described this experiment's outcome: "The results revealed that
participants' choices of Black faces during the recognition task varied as a function
of exposure to the primes. Those exposed to the crime-related primes were more
likely to choose stereotypically Black distracters as compared to those exposed to
the primes unrelated to crime."
Similarly, another study asked a different sample of officers to describe
various faces as more or less criminal-looking. 97 The officers described highly
86 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 225; Oliver et al., supra note 81, at 99-101.
87 Gray, supra note 57, at 115.
88 Id ("Although there is evidence for cross-cultural recognition of emotions, it appears that
emotional expressions may lose some of their meaning when translated across cultural boundaries."
(citation omitted)).
89 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, in CRITICAL RACE
REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAw 206, 207-08 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds.,
2008) (noting evidence of individual differences in racial bias and stereotyping and evidence of its
sometimes connection to biased behavior); but see David A. Kenny & Tessa V. West, Zero
Acquaintance: Definitions, Statistical Model, Findings, and Process, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra
note 56, at 129, 143 (arguing that individual differences are weak in "zero acquaintance studies").
90 See Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 224.
9' Eberhardt et al., supra note 79, at 885-88 (Study 4).




* Id96 id 
t
97 Eberhardt et al., supra note 79, at 888-89 (Study 5).
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stereotypic Black faces as looking more like criminals than they did for low
stereotypic Black faces.98
3. Egocentrism
A second cause of error is egocentrism-the tendency to assume that others
share one's knowledge, preferences, and attitudes.99  In some settings, that
assumption may be a fair one.100 But in other settings, such as middle-class White
officers policing poor Blacks, the assumption may be seriously flawed.101 Where
such knowledge, preferences, and attitudes differ, misunderstandings will arise,
and police will lack the shared experience and values needed to understand a
particular person's intentions.10 2
One example is that of supposed flight. Police perceive any quick, sudden, or
unexpected move as suspicious.10 3 They are particularly concerned about what
they perceive to be flight away from them, assuming that such flight indicates
consciousness of guilt.'1 That assumption may hold true in a local culture that
respects and trusts police to do the right thing. But in a culture, like that in many
poor Black neighborhoods, where police are distrusted both for under-protecting
the community and racially profiling its members while treating them with undue
aggression, flight from police may make much more sense.' Rightly or wrongly,
police may be perceived as a source of danger, too willing to stop the innocent,
98 Id. at 889-91; Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 224 (describing this study).
9 Gray, supra note 57, at 107.
1oo See Sandra L. Murray et al., Kindred Spirits? The Benefits of Egocentrism in Close
Relationships, 82 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 563, 563 (2002) (arguing that egocentrism can be
beneficial in those real-life relationships in which people really do have similar knowledge,
preferences, and attitudes).
101 See Lu-IN WANG, DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: How RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 18 (2006)
(elaborating on racial "failures of imagination"); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity
of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (2007) ("'Failures of imagination'
describe our limited empathy for those on the short end of the stereotyping stick, our weak ability to
stand in their shoes, see the world through their eyes, and be open to their points of view.").
102 See WANG, supra note 101, at 34-38 (offering detailed analysis of these failures of
imagination, including illustrating the sorts of racial misunderstandings by police that can arise and
their consequences).
103 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 151 (arguing that, to police, any perceived flight
is suspicious, including changing direction or pulling one's hat down in or near police presence).
104 See id
105 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the
Internment, 70 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2257, 2299-2302 (2002) (offering a detailed analysis of the cultural
differences involved in interpreting the meaning of flight from the police by poor racial minorities in
certain neighborhoods); Taslitz, supra note 28, at 99-101 (analyzing social science data concerning
differences in White versus Black attitudes toward the police).
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humiliate them, or trap them into saying or doing things they do not mean. o' Even
if it is not the officer whom the residents fear, they may recognize that the officer's
presence might mean that someone is up to no good, seeing it as not worth staying
in the area when a gun fight breaks out.'07 Many poor Black children are indeed
raised to be wary of the police, to view avoiding them as preferable to dealing with
them. 08 Police from a sharply different cultural background in which the officer is
one's friend may thus overemphasize flight, misconstruing its meaning by seeing
an effort to flee to safety as an effort to elude capture.'0 9
Part of the problem, of course, is a failure of empathy.o"0 Whether a crime has
been committed usually turns on the suspect's mental state, not merely his acts."'
Mental states, in the commonsense notion of the term, including motivations, can
also make a particular crime more likely to occur.112  Yet different social
backgrounds make empathy harder.'" 3 When empathy fails, observers judge others
based more on stereotypes than a true understanding of the others' nature or
situation.14  Failed empathy is inconsistent, therefore, with the kind of
individualized judgment that the probable cause and reasonable suspicion concepts
demand." 5
106 See generally Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126-40 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (outlining reasons for fleeing from police); Lenese C. Herbert, Can 't You See
What I'm Saying?: Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 135 (2002) (arguing that racial minority flight from the police in certain neighborhoods is
best understood as an act of protest-defiance of police as an institution perceived to be both unduly
passive in protecting residents from crime and unduly aggressive in assuming resident guilt and
pursuing proof of that assumption).
107 See Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2297-2301.
108 See JIM WALLIS, THE SOUL OF POLITICS: BEYOND "RELIGIOUS RIGHT" AND "SECULAR LEFT"
90-93 (Harvest Book 1995) (1994) (telling "Butch's story," a tale told to a White, middle-class
pastor by a Black woman in a lower-income neighborhood about how she raised her son to flee or
hide from the police).
10 See Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2299-2301.
no See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The Roles of Imagination
and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42 TEx. TECH L. REV. 419, 431-41 (2009)
(explaining "empathy"); WANG, supra note 101, at 83-106 (analyzing empathy failures as "failures
of imagination").
"' See Taslitz, supra note 36, at 8-12.
112 Id
" See Taslitz, supra note I10, at 433-34.
114 Id. at 434.
"1s See id.; Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 40-52) (defining "individualized suspicion"
and explaining its role in the probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations).
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4. Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
Error can also arise from "self-fulfilling prophecies.""'6  Given an officer's
flawed assumption of common knowledge with his target and the influence of the
fundamental attribution error, the officer may believe that the target is up to no
good, at least subconsciously conveying that belief to the target via body
language."' The target picks up on these cues, again perhaps subconsciously, and
behaves nervously or resentfully-just as the officer expects."'8  That behavior
confirms the officer's suspicions, further escalating the cycle of self-fulfillment.'19
Yet neither party is likely aware of this process. 120
The officer's own influence on others' behavior, prompting action that the
officer sees as suspicious, is simply not on most officers' radar, screens.121 If it
were, they would act more carefully, attempting to avoid unwittingly influencing
suspect behavior consistent with innocence to become behavior that appears more
consistent with guilt.122 Indeed, officers might see some of their behavior as wisely
changing a target's behavior.123 The target's turn toward more suspicious behavior
is seen by the officer as the target simply revealing his true nature.124 The officer
in turn takes credit for the target revealing his true colors, never considering that
the truest colors might have been those shown before the confrontational officer
made his appearance.12 5
5. Motivation and Personal Responsibility for Judgments
High motivation to understand others can, however, increase accuracy in
judging personality, probably because such motivation makes perceivers "behave
in ways that make their interaction partner feel more comfortable in divulging
116 Monica J. Harris & Christopher P. Garris, You Never Get a Second Chance to Make a First
Impression: Behavioral Consequences of First Impressions, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at
147, 157-59 (discussing the "self-fulfilling nature of first impressions," which arises from
"interpersonal expectancy effects," that is, from the expectations of both the perceiver and the subject
contributing to changing the latter's behavior to conform with the former's first impression).
" See Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1099-1101; WANG, supra note 101, at 34-38.
" See Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1139-42.
See id. at 1091-92.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 1091-97 (explaining the subconscious processes at work); WANG, supra note
101, at 35-36.
122 See Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1099-1108.
123 This speculation follows from officers' overconfidence in their ability to obtain truthful
confessions. See infra text accompanying notes 147-60.
124 See Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1091.
12s See id. at 1134-37.
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relevant cues to personality."' One way to increase accuracy motivation is to
hold perceivers "personally responsible for the accuracy of their impressions," for
then they "devote more effort to forming them, leading to more individuating
impressions, especially when the target's behavior [does] not match the initial
expectancy or stereotype. 127 This observation suggests that structuring police
reward systems-both material and psychic rewards-to encourage accurate,
individuated judgments about targets' personality traits may improve officer
judgments on at least the attribute of personality, even upon first impression. 128
Under such conditions, officers may seek more individuating information in
126 Gray, supra note 57, at 111; see also Max Weisbuch et al., Remnants of the Recent Past:
Influences ofPriming on First Impressions, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at 289, 302-03.
Professor Weisbuch and colleagues agree that most people would prefer that their first impressions
"be based on [the target] individual's behaviors and characteristics rather than on an irrelevant
remnant of recent experience." Id. at 302. But, they further explain the "extent to which people have
this motivation, however, varies by person and by situation," with most having a fairly weak
accuracy motivation, one akin to the desire to avoid biases in preferences for recreational activities.
See id. On the other hand, where strong motivation is present:
Increases in accuracy motivation should lead to increasingly accurate first
impressions, unbiased by recent environmental cues. That is, accuracy motivation
prompts (1) systematic processing and careful consideration of a target's characteristics
and behaviors, (2) consideration of a wide variety of alternative possibilities, and/or (3)
constant revising of the impression. All of these processes may lead to correction
processes or the consideration of more information (which would dilute the impact of the
prime).
Id. at 302 (citations omitted).
127 Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 162 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Susan T.
Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 231-49 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (supporting this point); see
Stephanie Madon et al., Stereotyping the Stereotypic: When Individuals Match Social Stereotypes, 36
J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 178, 178 (2006) (noting motivational-accuracy effects can be particularly
pronounced when the target's behavior fails to match that of the initial expectancy of stereotype); see
also Thomas E. Ford & Arie W. Kruglanski, Effects of Epistemic Motivations on the Use of
Accessible Constructs in Social Judgment, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 950, 950-52
(1995) (demonstrating that telling subjects prior to observing a target that they should form as
accurate an impression of him as they can because they will be asked to justify their impression to the
experimenter increases first impression accuracy). One important influence on first impressions, it
should be noted, is recent experience or "prime." Weisbuch et al., supra note 126, at 289-90. There
are two major kinds of primes: "abstract trait" primes and "exemplar" primes. Id. at 291. These
traits and exemplars are most accessible to memory, thus influencing one's impressions of his or her
most recent acquaintances. See id. If you are primed with negative concepts, such as Bill's
dangerousness, that too will increase the chances of your perceiving George as dangerous too. Id. at
291-92. Strong accuracy motivation may sometimes reverse the impact of abstract trait primes, but
has "little if any effect on the impact of exemplar trait primes." Id. at 303; see Diederik A. Stapel &
Willem Koomen, When Stereotype Activation Results in (Counter)Stereotypical Judgments: Priming
Stereotype-Relevant Traits and Exemplars, 34 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 136, 136 (1998).
128 Cf Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363 (explaining the impact of reward and punishment systems on individual police officers,
albeit in the context of determining the likely deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and its
alternatives).
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specific cases and learn more effectively from training designed to encourage more
individualized judgments about personality.129
Accuracy may increase further with greater exposure to the target, particularly
if she is observed in a diverse environment, a luxury thait police often do not
have.13 0  Getting to know a person takes time, something police lack when
responding to a crime in progress.'3 ' Still, where circumstances permit, more
observation time, combined with motivational rewards and personal police
accountability for making individualized judgments, should lead to improving
those judgments. 13 2 This last observation reflects the more general point that more
relevant information can increase the accuracy of many types of first-impression
judgments. 3 3
6. Cognitive Load
Limits on "cognitive load" also impair accuracy.134 Cognitive load refers to
the number of demands simultaneously made upon the human mind.13 1 Perceivers
making judgments while stressed, preoccupied with other matters, or
multitasking-all likely to be common features of police work-make quick
judgments, "using biases and stereotypes, and consistent with impressions formed
of similar individuals."1 36 Under such circumstances, observers may ignore, for
example, obvious (and innocent) situational causes of nervousness, attributing it to
character. 37  Moreover, cognitively busy observers notice events in the
129 See infra text accompanying notes 346-67, 482-548. The argument might be made that
simple professional pride will motivate police to get the answer to the question "who did it?" right.
But motivation to catch the right guy is not the same as motivation to individuate the suspect, and, as
the first impressions research suggests, properly structured incentives can help to improve motivation
to get that judgment right. An officer can act in a perfectly good faith belief that a suspect is up to no
good, but that belief may stem from subconscious biases, stereotypes, and other flawed judgments.
130 See Gray, supra note 57, at 110 (discussing increased exposure); Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial
Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1181, 1196-97 (2005) (noting that police often
act under time urgency, a context that leads to rigid, less-adaptive thinking, too-ready discarding of
alternative causes of action, a narrowed field of attention, an enhanced sense of threat, an increased
reliance on stereotyping, and an overall decline in cognitive functioning).
131 See generally Taslitz, supra note 130.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 355-67, 421-28, 454-548.
133 See Gray, supra note 57, at 121 ("The perceiver must detect the relevant available
information."); id. at 122 ("Accuracy depends partly on . .. the information available to the perceiver
134 See Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 162-63.
13s See id.
136 Id. at 163.
" See id; Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21, 21 (1995) (concluding that cognitively busy observers automatically make dispositional,
rather than situational, inferences and later fail to correct their initial impressions); Daniel T. Gilbert
et al., On Cognitive Busyness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons Perceived, 54 J. PERSONALITY
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environment that confirm their initial expectations, ignoring contradicting
evidence.138  When cognitive overload and low accuracy motivation occur
simultaneously, the result can be "especially damaging to perceivers' tendency to
make individuating impressions."1 39  Given the many simultaneous cognitive
demands made on police patrolling a beat under circumstances of time urgency-
for example, complying with the Constitution, watching the suspect, following
departmental guidelines, protecting against danger-police stopping and frisking
are likely to do so under circumstances of heavy cognitive load, therefore suffering
from all its incapacities.140
Interestingly, persons who are more empathetic and less racially, ethnically,
or otherwise prejudiced are more likely to make accurate judgments of the
emotional meaning conveyed, for example, by other-race faces.14 1 Although they
too are subject to the distortions of high cognitive load, these distortions are likely
to be less than those of persons lacking adequate empathy and egalitarianism. 14 2
They are also more likely to be "more democratic and less dogmatic,"1 4 3
suggesting a greater willingness to consider other viewpoints, avoid stereotyping,
and be open to revising judgments than less empathetic persons.'" Indeed,
injections into male perceivers of the hormone oxytocin, which enhances personal
behavior and affiliation, substantially improved their ability to accurately gauge
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 733, 734-36 (1988) (cognitively busy observers wrongly attributed the nervousness
of a woman on videotape to her disposition while more cognitively idle observers correctly attributed
her nervousness to the situation).
138 See Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 163 ("Presumably, being under cognitive load
prevents perceivers from noticing or attending to expectancy-discrepant behavior on the part of the
target and therefore being less likely to revise their expectancies or impressions of the target.");
Monica J. Harris & Rebecca Perkins, Effects of Distraction on Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: A
Social Interaction Test of the Cognitive Busyness Hypothesis, 13 Soc. COGNITION 163, 163 (1995)
(perceivers' cognitive busyness resulted in their finding more behavioral confirmation in the target's
behavior than when not cognitively busy).
139 Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 163; Kristen N. Moreno & Galen V. Bodenhausen,
Resisting Stereotype Change: The Role of Motivation and Attentional Capacity in Defending Social
Beliefs, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 5, 12-13 (1999) (finding greatest stereotyping in
perceivers having low motivation and lower-still attentional capacity).
140 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 51, 68, 148, 167, 238-39, 245-46 (illustrating
many of the simultaneous pressures facing police).
141 See Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 95 ("Individuals high in AFI [accuracy of first
impressions] are also more empathic, though . . . there are exceptions." ) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id. at 97-98 (those high in AFI use less gender stereotyping, display less social prejudice,
including less prejudice against African-Americans and those of Jewish ethnicity).
142 See id.
143 Id. at 98; see ROBERT ROSENTHAL ET AL., SENSITIVITY TO NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION:
THE PONS TEST (1979) (offering major empirical support for this point).
144 See Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 97-98 (summarizing literature on reduced
prejudice and AFI accuracy); Taslitz, supra note 110, at 431-36 (analyzing the cognitive advantages
of empathy).
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targets' mental states from facial cues.145 Researchers speculate that the improved
accuracy comes from a greater motivation to understand others and take the time to
engage in social interactions in order to gather the information needed for
accurately "reading" others' minds.14 6 Giving police regular oxytocin injections
does not seem to be a practical solution to lowering police error rates. On the other
hand, because police should naturally share the general human variability in
empathy and egalitarianism, that too raises reason for caution in concluding that
police generally merit deference in their judgments based upon first impressions.
7. Lie Detection
Remember that even those studies finding accurate initial impression
formation by some people under certain conditions involved truthful targets.14 7
But most people are notoriously bad at accurately divining deception, doing little
better than chance.14 8  There are several reasons for this poor performance.
Importantly, perceivers rarely receive prompt, objective feedback ,on their
deception judgments, depriving them of the opportunity to learn from their
mistakes.149 They also lack "cognitive flexibility," lacking the time and energy to
"gather all observable cues-from the verbal and nonverbal streams of behavior-
and then reconsider this evidence in light of information about the deceiver's
goals, pursuits, and personal character."' 50 But "[p]erceivers often find it difficult
to step this far outside their own perspective.""' Cues to deception may also be so
"idiosyncratic" that perceivers simply cannot develop a general judgmental
strategy to apply across persons and situations.152 Accuracy can improve over a
substantial period of time and in an increasingly close relationship, options rarely
145 Gregor Domes et al., Oxytocin Improves "Mind-Reading" in Humans, 61 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 731, 732 (2007) (finding that a single dose of oxytocin substantially improved men's
ability to interpret facial cues to mental states); Larry J. Young & Zuoxin Wang, The Neurobiology of
Pair Bonding, 7 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1048, 1048 (2004) (noting oxytocin's critical role in
prosocial behavior and affiliation); see Bhismadev Chakrabarti & Simon Baron-Cohen, The Biology
of Mind Reading, in FIRST IMPRESSIONS, supra note 56, at 57 (summarizing the biology of empathy,
especially emphasizing gendered differences in empathizing ability).
146 Gray, supra note 57, at 114; see generally Thomas R. Insel & Larry J. Young, The
Neurobiology ofAttachment, 2 NATURE REvs. NEUROSCIENCE 129 (2001) (analyzing data supporting
this point).
147 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
148 See Gray, supra note 57, at 116; Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M DePaulo, Accuracy of
Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REv. 214, 214 (2006) (finding in the
growing body of literature an average lie detection accuracy rate of 54%).
149 Gray, supra note 57, at 116.
1 Id
151 Id; see generally Boaz Keysar, The Illusory Transparency of Intention: Linguistic
Perspective Taking in Text, 26 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 165 (1994).
152 Gray, supra note 57, at 116.
2010] 27
28 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 8:7
available to police.'53 One longitudinal study, for example, found that increased
deception-detection accuracy occurred over five months of additional time to
develop a friendship but only for close friends.154
Police often believe that their training and experience make them better lie
detectors.'" They are wrong:
On the contrary, in a meta-analysis of the literature, Aamodt and Custer
found that "professional lie catchers" (such as police officers, detectives,
judges, secret service agents, and parole officers) were no more accurate
at detecting deception than were students and other citizens. The
professionals had an average accuracy rate (56%) only slightly higher
than novices (54%). It could be that formal training disrupts the normal
ways in which we learn to recognize cues to deception. More
specifically, formal training may focus our attention on "salient and
plausible," but nondiagnostic[,] cues. 56
Of course, there may be ways to improve lie-detection training. A few social
scientists believe that they can improve such training via a complex and unusual
training process-one that may therefore be impractical for most sorts of daily
policing.'57 Moreover, these methods and others may require use of equipment not
'5 See id (making this point about close friends, but noting that it may not extend to mere
colleagues or friendly acquaintances).
I54 Id.; D. Eric Anderson et al., The Development ofDeception Detection Skill: A Longitudinal
Study ofSame-Sex Friends, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 539 (2002) (finding that
over a five-month period close friends' accuracy in detecting each others' lies increased from 47% to
61%, while less close friends showed a small decrease in lie-detection accuracy and, overall,
accuracy did not improve).
155 See PETER B. AINSWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLICING 99-101 (2002) (noting that most
law enforcement officers assume that suspects initially lie but that they can eventually be persuaded
to admit their guilt); cf Gray, supra note 57, at 116 ("One might expect expertise, experience, and
formal training to bolster lie detection accuracy.").
1s6 Gray, supra note 57, at 116-17 (citation omitted). Most of the deception detection
literature relies on experimental laboratory studies, "when the liar's motivation to be successful may
be minimal." Id. at 117. One meta-analysis found that in high-stakes situations, where a liar
necessarily has a greater motivation to succeed, the liar becomes tenser, using less eye contact and a
higher-pitched voice, thus arguably making deception more transparent. Bella M. DePaulo et al.,
Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 97 (2003). Another study reached similar conclusions
concerning real-life high-stakes situations, including police interrogations. See Samantha Mann et
al., Detecting True Lies: Police Officers' Ability to Detect Suspects' Lies, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
137, 137-38 (2004). "It is," however, "as yet unclear whether this greater transparency during
higher-stakes situations results in greater accuracy on the part of perceivers." Gray, supra note 57, at
118.
1 See Gray, supra note 57, at 117 (summarizing the work of Professor Paul Ekman and other
leading scholars in this field); Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 99 (concluding that training
people in nonverbal cue recognition has achieved "some" measure of success in improving first
impression accuracy, but "it is not known how lasting or how generalizable such effects are").
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now readily available- to police departments and 'often take more time to use
effectively than is available to officers making target-deception judgments.18
Apart from deception detection, it is interesting to note that advanced theatrical
training-again not likely a common experience among officers-improves
accuracy in making judgments about the nature of social relationships, such as the
existence and degree of rapport.'5 9  This improvement may occur because
"theatrical training sensitizes [people] to the meaning of particular gestures, facial
displays, and vocal patterns." 60
C. Resistance to Changing First Impressions
Once initial impressions have been made, they are hard to change.' 6' This
observation is especially worrisome because first impressions can be made before
even meeting a person. "Reputations, rumors, job or school applications, or
offhand comments made by friends all provide perceivers with a rich set of
descriptive information-information that may or may not accurately describe the
target's personality."l 6 3 This situation may be common among the police, who
may rely on neighborhood "snitches" (often paid or otherwise confidential
informants), gossip, or reports of a suspect's isolated, seemingly bad acts before
ever meeting the person.164
One well-respected theory, the "continuum model," 65 explains the subsequent
cognitive processes as follows: after making an initial category-based judgment, a
perceiver, if motivated to do so, will assess the target in greater detail.16 6 But the
158 See generally ALEX PENTLAND WITH TRACY HEIBECK, HONEST SIGNALS: How THEY SHAPE
OUR WORLD app. at 111 (2008) (using a new device, the "sociometer," Professor Pentland recorded
micro-expressions and movements of his subjects to detect unconscious "honest" social signals, a
back-channel form of communication revealing such things as when subjects are bluffing).
159 See Gray, supra note 57, at 120.
160 Id; see Mark Costanzo, Training Students to Decode Verbal and Nonverbal Cues: Effects
on Confidence and Performance, 84 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 308, 308 (1992). Studying music or dancing
also may improve first impression accuracy, and watching a good deal of television may improve
accuracy in judging the meanings of facial expressions. Hall & Andrzejewski, supra note 56, at 99.
161 See Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 157.
162 Id. at 164.
163 Id
' See generally ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE
EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 1-4, 15-17 (2009) (describing how and why informants are used in
the American justice system and examining the social costs and benefits of doing so); Taslitz, supra
note 27, at 1132-37 (comparing the social processes involved in informant use to those involved in
everyday gossip).
165 Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention
and Interpretation, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 4-8 (Mark P. Zanna ed.,
1990); Fiske et al., supra note 127, at 231.
166 Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 162.
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perceiver's bias in this assessment will be toward confirming initial judgments
rather than challenging them, and this should generally be as true for professionals
as it is for laypersons.167 If investigation nevertheless makes an initial judgment
seem so questionable that alternatives must be considered, the perceiver will look
for an alternative categorical generalization or stereotype in which to place the
target.168 Only if that effort at re-categorization fails will the perceiver attempt
"piecemeal integration of the target's attributes, with the goal of forming a
coherent impression," in other words, a more particularized judgment.169
Police errors can have longer-lasting consequences than a failed search or an
unnecessary stop. The search and seizure error can set into motion a chain of
events that leads to a wrongful conviction and sentence. 170 Data supporting this
point is particularly rich where race is involved.171 I have discussed this data in
great detail elsewhere.172  Here is a brief summary of the process: a person
belonging to a racial minority may be irritated or angry about a stop, enhancing
police suspicions, a point I noted briefly above. 73 These enhanced suspicions lead
officers to tunnel vision, gathering enough confirming evidence to arrest while
ignoring contradicting evidence.1 74  Increased police suspicion leads to
increasingly harsh investigation tactics, including flawed lineups and interrogation
practices. 17 As a result, the suspect is wrongly fingered by a mistaken eyewitness,
then, lacking hope for ready relief from the high-pressure tactics, confesses to a
crime he did not commit.' 76 This process is not fanciful. It is well documented
and is the most plausible explanation for a significant number of wrongful
convictions. 7 7
In sum, though much of the time perceivers' first impressions about targets'
behavior and personality are accurate, they also are often wrong. Yet these
mistakes can convey cues prompting seemingly confirming behavior by targets,
167 See Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 207-08 (describing this bias's nature generally);
infra text accompanying notes 170-83 (examining this bias's operation for one type of professional:
the police).
168 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 207-08; see also Fiske et al., supra note 127, at 232-
34 (noting that "certain social categories-such as gender, ethnicity, and age-are 'privileged,' in
that they can be easily applied to most people one encounters").
169 Maddox & Dukes, supra note 80, at 207-08; see Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 162.
170 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121, 125 (2006).
171 See generally Taslitz, supra note 27 (summarizing much of the data).
172 See id.
1 See Taslitz, supra note 170, at 127-28.
174 See id. at 130-31.
175 See id. at 130-33; Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1091-92.
176 See Taslitz, supra note 170, at 130-33; Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1091-92.
177 See Taslitz, supra note 170, at 130-33; Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1091-99.
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creating a self-fulfilling prophecy.178 Stereotype activation, especially based on
race, can make the situation still worse. Perceivers ignore contradicting evidence,
refrain from reconsidering initial judgments, and limit the scope of investigation
undertaken.179 These flaws can be magnified by perceivers' lousy ability to detect
deception.'80 One author bemoaned the harm this process can cause in everyday
life, much less in policing. Worried this author:
How many potentially excellent employees have gone unhired
because they were, say, obese? How many graduate students have we
turned down for our programs because they reminded us of a former
student who dropped out after a year? How many of us have missed out
on a lifelong, deeply rewarding romantic relationship because the person
in question had the "wrong" color of hair or taste in music, or a laugh
that was just a little bit too loud?"'
But, concludes this same author, "[p]erhaps the real tragedy of the behavioral
consequences of first impressions is that we rarely discover when our impressions
have led us awry." 8 2 This observation is as true for police officers as for other
persons: we simply have no practical way to tell whether police hunches in a
particular case are right or wrong if we rely on hunches-the bare conclusions or
feelings of the officer-alone.183
D. A First Look at the Error-Reduction Advantages of an Individualized Suspicion
Mandate
1. General Principles
There are thus good cognitive reasons to avoid deferring to officer hunches,
instincts, and bare reliance on generalizations based on officer "experience,"
particularly in the context of first impressions. But if, as most commentators
agree, a major purpose of the Fourth Amendment is indeed to limit officer
discretion, then there is still more reason to reject such deference.184
The individualized suspicion mandate is a sound alternative to deference and
a useful way to reduce the risk of error. Much error stems from stereotypes and
178 See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 77-125, 134-42.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
18 Harris & Garris, supra note 116, at 164-65.
182 Id. at 165.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 56-66.
18 See Maclin, supra note 55, at 201 ("[T]he central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is
distrust of police power and discretion.").
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other generalizations.' The individualization mandate specifically rejects mere
generalization in favor of significant suspect-specific evidence of individual
wrongdoing.' 86 Coming up with such individualized evidence-precisely because
reliance cannot be placed solely on generalizations or prior experience-requires
data gathering, more data thus being available to inform officer judgments.' 7 Data
gathering likely requires corroborating and converging sources of evidence.' 88
Moreover, if judges and others are giving serious scrutiny to officer decisions,
officers are more motivated not simply to find a suspect or make a "collar"
confirming their gut instincts, but to get these decisions right. 8 9
Indeed, because the individualization mandate impliedly contains a mandate
for officer explanation of his actions, the officer must anticipate objections to gaps
in the evidence, thus seeking to fill them, perhaps even to explore alternative
potential perpetrators.190 These reasons must be sufficient to persuade a judge that
probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists. 9 Officers must thus also be ready
to address with specificity concerns that their sources are lying or mistaken.192
Of course, the individualization mandate will not alone fix all the potential
cognitive errors. But it will at least provide an incentive for training that further
helps to do sO.193 The more robust the individualized suspicion requirement, and
the more it incorporates the insights of modem cognitive science, the greater the
impetus for appropriate training, wherever feasible.
The importance of the officer explanation/justification aspect of
individualized suspicion cannot be overemphasized. Because it is so difficult to
know when an officer's hunches alone are right, when wrong, her explanations
become crucial to aiding a court, jury, or prosecutor in determining on which side
of the right/wrong line a particular case falls.194  Moreover, significant social
science suggests that the mere expectation of having to offer detailed,
understandable explanations to an authority figure can reduce the influence of at
least some cognitive biases relevant to forming first impressions. 95
185 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 2-3 & n.5).
186 See id. (manuscript at 2-15).
187 See infra text accompanying notes 482-548 (discussing the duty to investigate).
188 See HENNING ET AL., supra note 1, at 52 (discussing the importance of various types of
corroboration in the probable cause inquiry).
189 See supra text accompanying note 146.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 482-548.
191 See HENNING ET AL., supra note 1, at 39-40.
192 See id. at 50-57 (discussing informant credibility as an example).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 535-48 (explaining more fully why the individualized
suspicion requirement creates incentives to investigate).
194 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 77, 240-43 (illustrating the sort of explanation
required in search warrant affidavits).
195 See, e.g., Ford & Kruglanski, supra note 127, at 950 (telling subjects about to make first
impressions that they must do so accurately because they will have to justify their conclusions to the
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2. Don't Blink!
Malcolm Gladwell, in Blink, the book that began this section's discussion,
implicitly recognizes both of these points as crucial, even outside the police
context. Gladwell populates his book with anecdotes. He starts with an anecdote
about the failure of the J. Paul Getty Museum in California to spot a purportedly
sixth-century B.C. statue-for which it had paid an enormous sum of money-as a
fake.' 96 But outside experts, often based on inarticulate hunches, had doubts.19 7
Ultimately, they were proven right.
Gladwell tells the tale as an example of hunches outperforming
deliberation.19 8 Yet he concedes that equally talented experts employed by the
Getty had no such hunches. 1 99 Why not? Gladwell argues that it was partly
because they listened to "scientific data" rather than their gut, but mostly because
they "desperately wanted the statue to be real," 200 precisely the kind of
confirmation bias against which cognitive science cautions.201 Drawing on another
theorist's comments, Gladwell argues that a leading decision maker at the Getty
simply "'fell in love with [the] piece."' 2 02
But how does one choose between the Getty experts' intuitions and those of
outside experts? The Getty did not simply defer to the outsiders. Instead, when
criticism mounted, it conducted further investigation.203 It was that additional
investigation that allowed the Getty to articulate specific reasons justifying its
change of mind.204 Those reasons included: (1) letters used to trace the statue's
origin were proven fakes by careful examination revealing that a postal code on a
letter dated 1952 did not exist until twenty years later; (2) another letter referred to
a bank account that was not opened until long after the letter's date; (3) more
careful examination revealed the statue to be a pastiche of styles from different
experimenter improved subjects' accuracy); cf Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on
the Fundamental Attribution Error, 48 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 227 (1985) (concluding, based upon
experimental data, that "accountability-pressures to justify one's causal interpretations of behavior
to others-reduces or eliminates" the (largely unconscious) fundamental attribution error).
196 GLADWELL, supra note 50, at 3-8.
'9' See id. at 5-6.
'98 See id. at 3-8.
'9 Id. at 14-15.
200 Id. at 14.
201 Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from
Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1566 (2009) (book
review) (defining the confirmation bias as one "which causes individuals to pick out information that
confirms or supports their tentative decisions and reject or downplay evidence that does not"). See
supra text accompanying notes 138-39; infra text accompanying notes 293-94.
202 GLADWELL, supra note 50, at 15.
203 Id. at 6-7.
204 See id. at 52.
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periods; and (4) more careful geologists concluded that the seemingly ancient
marble could have been aged in a few months using potato mold.205
The possibility that reasons are post hoc explanations given to justify
decisions made on other, subconscious grounds does not necessarily mean that
those reasons are unpersuasive.206 Careful, thorough investigation combined with
soundly articulated reasons focused on the particulars of a specific case is a sound
basis for decision, regardless of what sparked those efforts.207 This observation is
as true for police searches and seizures as it is for the Getty Museum or the myriad
other decision makers making daily judgments in everyday life.208
205 Id. at 7-8.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 190-95; infra text accompanying notes 355-67, 454-
72,478-81.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 190-95; infra text accompanying notes 355-67, 454-
72,478-81.
208 Psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer seemingly takes issue with this conclusion. See GERD
GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 13-15 (2007). Gigerenzer
offers an anecdote about a police officer who correctly guessed that a woman arriving at an airport
was a drug courier yet who, when asked by Gigerenzer, was unable to explain what was unusual
about the person he stopped. Id. at 14-15. Gigerenzer bemoans the American legal system's distrust
of these officer hunches and the system's insistence that officers "articulate specific facts to justify a
search, an interrogation, or an arrest." Id. at 15. The courts' "insistence on after-the-fact justification
ignores," Gigerenzer insists, the reality that "good expert judgment is generally of an intuitive
nature." Id Gigerenzer sees this insistence as hypocritical, arguing that judges and prosecutors
routinely rely on their inarticulate hunches in their own work. See id Concludes Gigerenzer:
However, the issue should be neither hunches per se nor the ability to come up with
reasons after the fact while hiding the unconscious nature of hunches. To avoid
discrimination, the legal system instead needs to survey the quality of policemen's
hunches, that is, a detective's actual success in spotting criminals. In other professions,
successful experts are evaluated by their performance rather than by their ability to give
post-hoc explanations for their performance. Chicken sexers, chess masters, professional
baseball players, award-winning writers, and composers are typically unable to fully
articulate how they do what they do. Many skills lack descriptive language.
Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted). Gigerenzer is right about one point: more research is needed into the
relative degree of success and failure rates (this is not quite what he said, but, given his scientific
background, I assume this is what he meant) of police in making probable cause and reasonable
suspicion judgments, rather than relying primarily on cognitive science research involving other
groups-though I have argued here that there is good reason to believe that such research is
transferable.
But he is wrong in most of the rest of his argument. As the Getty Museum example shows,
experts can learn to identify articulable bases for their hunches and to justify their actions in terms
understandable to others. So long as the experts do not lie about what they observed or did, it is
irrelevant whether the justifiable reasons they give are in fact their subjective reasons for action.
What matters is that they can objectively, yet truthfully, justify their actions in ways that permit them
to be subjected to scrutiny. Such scrutiny seems particularly important where, as with the police, the
experts' hunches are otherwise used to justify the state's use of force against its citizens. The
inherent violence of policing thus introduces a political element lacking, for example, when dealing
with "chicken sexers." Furthermore, Gigerenzer ignores the research suggesting that the mere
knowledge that a person must justify his actions to others reduces the likelihood of error in forming
his hunches in the first place. Gigerenzer also wrongly posits a dichotomy-inarticulate hunches
versus articulate lies or mistakes-when unconscious hunches and conscious reasoning can in fact
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III. Do INTUITION, EXPERIENCE, AND EXPERTISE HAVE ANY VALUE?
A. Overview
To caution, as I have above, that police, like all people, are too often subject
to inaccurate first impressions-impressions that may persist even after more
extended contact with a suspect-does not necessarily mean, however, that
intuitions are of no value. This subsection briefly summarizes some major benefits
of intuition. The rest of Part III complicates the picture, adding further benefits
and new problems while attempting to illustrate how combining intuition with
conscious rational thought can maximize the benefits of both while minimizing
their costs.
1. Rules vs. Intuition
One of the most obvious benefits of intuition arises when police must act
209quickly, particularly in ambiguous situations. In such cases, there are often few
alternatives to relying on intuition. Training police in standard procedures to
follow in some time-urgent cases is feasible if those situations are few and clear.210
But the number of situations where reasonable suspicion and probable cause
judgments must be made is vast, and their character often ambiguous.21'
Even if rules could be designed for every such situation, the number of rules
would be so unwieldy as to be useless in practice.212 Additionally, rules would
work well together and form a continuum rather than a dichotomy, as Part III of this article will
explain. Gigerenzer is also wrong about judges and prosecutors. Judges may start with a hunch, but
they must and do routinely justify it on more objective grounds, a process that might even sometimes
change their minds. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 107-11 (2008). The same is true
of prosecutors, as I can attest to from my own experience.
209 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 10. As Klein puts it:
Complex domains aren't as structured or stable as well-ordered ones. These
situations may change rapidly and unexpectedly. We have to keep track of more factors,
and they link to each other in lots of different ways. We may also have the feeling that
we don't know some of the important linkages. We aren't entirely sure what causes
events to happen. We can't make good predictions about what will happen next. And we
rely a lot on stories and examples instead of rules.
Id.
210 See id. at 15-16, 19-21 (noting that procedures embody current wisdom, shield against
interruptions, act as reminders, and provide standards for evaluation, but they cannot anticipate the
many unexpected real-world situations requiring judgment, ignore the importance of context, can
become so lengthy and complex as to be incomprehensible, and quickly become outdated).
211 See, e.g., TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 185-226 (collecting real-world cases and
problems based on real-world situations, illustrating the diversity, ambiguity, and complexity of the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion judgments); David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion,
Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio,
72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 975 (1998) (analyzing illustrative case law).
212 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 19-21.
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become quickly outdated as new situations arose.213 It is particularly difficult to
rely on the categorization process embodied in rules in areas like reasonable
suspicion and probable cause, where the law mandates individualized treatment of
every situation as if in some sense unique.214 Excessive reliance on rules can also
make police unmotivated and intellectually dull.215 Furthermore, it is difficult to
216design rules on how to resolve ambiguous circumstances. Judgment is
unavoidable.217
This observation does not mean, on the other hand, that rules are irrelevant to
policing. To the contrary, even in the area of searches and seizures, rules can be
designed for a relatively small number of commonly recurring situations.2 18 Rules
work best when they are treated as guidelines-subject to departure for good
219
reason-rather than as rigid mandates. More flexible guidelines structuring the
process by which officers exercise their intuition and provide safeguards against
intuitive error can also be designed, a point to be explained more fully below.220
Intuition itself can be molded and educated by improved training procedures and
better "inputs" offered to inform intuition's exercise.22 1 Intuitions thus work best
in the world of search and seizure when they are combined with more conscious,
systematic thinking embodied in rules, guidelines, justification requirements, and
222
accountability systems.
213 Id. at 21.
214 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (articulating an extended defense of this argument).
215 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 23-24.
216 See id. at 10. Indeed, rules can sometimes so foster inefficiency that those subject to them
look for ways to work around them, often distrusting them as obsolete or counterproductive. Id. at
21.
217 See id. at 28 ("In complex situations, people will need judgment skills to follow procedures
effectively and to go beyond them when necessary.") (emphasis omitted).
218 See, e.g., TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 304-05, 311-13 (summarizing common police
department rules on the use of deadly force); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 49-62 (2005) (discussing model police department rules governing "critical
incidents," such as use of force, high-speed vehicle pursuits, handling violent mentally-disordered
persons, foot pursuits, use of police canines, and display of weapons).
219 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 28; WALKER, supra note 218, at 46-47 (noting that discretion
can never be eliminated in policing).
220 See WALKER, supra note 218, at 46-49 (describing the potential functions of well-designed
police department rules as confining discretion (e.g., permitting deadly force only in defense of life),
structuring it (specifying, via guidelines, the factors officers should consider in making decisions),
checking it (via review), promoting accountability that clarifies department priorities, and providing
training tools).
221 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 31 (training people in procedures by having them work through
scenarios to learn when to follow procedures and when and how to depart from them also helps
trainees "acquire some of the tacit knowledge they need in order to apply procedures effectively").
222 See supra Part I; infra text accompanying notes 346-48.
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2. When to Investigate? Pattern Matching and Anomaly Spotting
Intuition can likewise aid in rapid pattern matching, allowing police to spot
far more patterns than could ever be embodied in rules and to see new patterns
emerge over time.2 23 Expertise-partly consisting of trained intuition-can help
officers see relevant facts and their interrelationships in ways that would be
invisible to the novice.224 As one commentator explains, "We [laypersons] rely on
tacit knowledge to interpret facts, to judge their credibility, to fit them together,
and to judge what counts as a relevant fact in the first place."225 Police do the
same thing.
The flip side of pattern matching is anomaly spotting.226 Whatever does not
fit a pattern is viewed as anomalous, requiring further investigation to explain the
227 thpoiincongruity. To the police, one former officer explains, "[i]ncongruity is a fancy
word that means you look out of place, like you don't belong somewhere."228 That
officers sense that a person does not belong may stem from, in the dictionary sense
of the word, a true anomaly-an observation not readily explained by prior
experience229 -or may instead stem from fitting a perceived familiar pattern, but a
pattern that officers associate with being "up to no good." 2 30 Either way, "[c]ops
are incredibly attuned to incongruity." 2 3 1 Without pattern matching and anomaly
spotting, officers would have little to guide them concerning when, where, how,
and why to investigate in time-urgent, ambiguous situations.232 Nor would officers
223 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 41-43.
224 See id. at 36 ("With experience we learn to see things that others don't notice."); id. at 37
("With experience we learn where to took as well as how to make discriminations and recognize
connections.").
225 Id. at 34.
226 See id. at 43 ("We draw on dozens and hundreds of experiences to sense when something
seems familiar, or to pick up anomalies.").
227 See id. at 44 (noting that the "interplay between noticing typical cases and anomalous ones
is a type of tacit knowledge found in many fields," including nursing, where nurses' ability to spot
anomalies makes them "early warning systems to catch weak signals that a patient is starting to
deteriorate," and weather forecasters, who choose what regions to watch most carefully for further
developments based upon anomaly spotting).
228 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 147.
229 See MICROSOFT ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTIONARY 54 (2001) (defining an "anomaly" as
"something that deviates from the norm or from expectations," a "peculiarity," or "something strange
and difficult to identify or classify") (emphasis omitted).
230 See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2293-2302 (discussing police interpretation of
"flight").
231 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 152.
232 Cf id. at 152 ("[I]ncongruous" situations to an officer include a beat-up car slowly cruising
a wealthy neighborhood; a man in a tuxedo strolling ship-free docks at midnight; dogs howling
uncontrollably; yells paired with doors slamming; an expensive limousine cruising the barrio; and an
evening-gown-clad woman walking a dirt road alone, none of which are "illegal, just unusual. They
make curious cops want to stop the people involved and find out more.").
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have "Aha moments" that can send investigations into new, more productive
directions.233 But, once again, biases, poor data, and defective training can turn
necessary tools of law enforcement into error-generating machines.234
3. Sense Making Through Storytelling
Knowing when and where to investigate are, however, insufficient guides to
action. An officer must be able to make sense of the data she has collected.
Officers, like all people, make sense of the world through mental models-"the
stories we construct to understand how things work."235 Sensible stories require a
full sense of the context in which events occur.236 Intution at its best thus aids
officers in paying attention to that context.237 Story generation is not necessarily a
"final stage" in sense making. Rather, each of the processes noted here-pattern
matching, anomaly spotting, data gathering-may be guided by tentative stories
and will help in revising and fleshing out later stories.238 Store detectives, for
example, monitor shopper behavior for patterns suggesting shoplifting. 239 They do
233 See MARK FUHRMAN, THE MURDER BUSINESS: HOW THE MEDIA TURNS CRIME INTO
ENTERTAINMENT AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE 1-21, 45 (2009). The author, a former detective now
working in the media, began his own investigation of the infamous Caylee Anthony child murder
case and then of the Stacy Peterson case until "[1]ittle by little, the details and minutiae added up."
Id. at 45. "They pressured law enforcement in Will County to ... do a real investigation on Drew
Peterson [as a suspect]." Id.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 50-160; infra text accompanying notes 255-317.
235 KLEIN, supra note 5, at 44; J. Kevin Ford & Kurt Kraiger, The Application of Cognitive
Constructs and Principles to the Instructional Systems Model of Training: Implications for Needs
Assessment, Design, and Transfer, in 10 INT'L REV. INDUS. & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 1, 14-15,
22, 34 (Cary L. Cooper & Ivan T. Robertson eds., 1995) (defining as other synonyms for mental
models the terms "knowledge structures," "cognitive maps," and "task schematic"); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 394-432 (1996) (summarizing cognitive science research and processes
involved in story creation).
236 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1045-61 (1998); Andrew E. Taslitz, What Feminism Has to Offer Evidence
Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 171, 196-203 (1999).
237 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 36, 44-45; Taslitz, supra note 235, at 410-19 (discussing
"epistemological filters" that screen some aspects of the world from our perceptions while
heightening our attention to other aspects).
238 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 36, 44-46 (explaining the story generation process). Conscious
and subconscious processes thus interact in the story creation and revision process. Gary Klein, a
senior scientist at Applied Research, makes an analogous point:
Further, these different aspects [of tacit knowledge] can include conscious thinking.
When we perform workarounds, when we use our mental models, we are usually
deliberating about the tasks at hand. Tacit knowledge is critical for these activities but
we are also thinking critically, relying on our memory, consciously imagining how things
might play out, and so forth.
Id. at 36.
239 See id. at 41-42.
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so, however, by "trying to see if your movements fit into a sensible story of a
person trying to figure out which product to buy, or if they are the disconnected
actions of a shoplifter attempting to create confusion." 240 When the detective is
satisfied that enough parts of a convincing story are in place, the detective acts,
confronting the shopper in an effort to confirm or refute the story the detective has
crafted.241
Many stories are rooted in stock cultural tales that may or may not accurately
reflect social reality.24 2 Each individual's life experience also affects the stories
she crafts, though those stories may be inapposite in judging the actions of another
person with a radically different life experience.243 Impoverished or skewed sets of
narratives can thus also lead to error. The trick is to help police build richer
narrative mental models. 244
4. Satisficing
The law prohibits stopping suspects based on mere "hunches." 245 But those
hunches, initially based partly on complex, rapid, and subconscious processes, 246
are necessary to effective police investigation.247 Hunches can help police
generate new ideas, spot otherwise "invisible" evidence, and nip crime in the bud
before harm occurs. 24 8 In an ever-changing, ambiguous world, police perfection
cannot be achieved, nor does the law require it.249 Instead, police "satisfice"-they
240 Id. at 42.
241 See id. at 41-42.
242 See Taslitz, supra note 235, at 433-39, 465-75.
243 See id. at 410-19, 434-39.
244 There can be a critical conscious, articulated component to training police in richer mental
models. As Klein again put it: "A number of studies have shown that procedures help people handle
typical tasks, but people do best in novel situations when they understand the system they need to
control. People taught to understand the system develop richer mental models than people taught to
follow procedures." KLEIN, supra note 5, at 23 (footnote omitted).
245 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
246 See GIGERENZER, supra note 208, at 13-19 (discussing police hunches and hunches more
generally). Gigerenzer defines a "hunch" as a "judgment ... that appears quickly in consciousness . .
. whose underlying reasons we are not fully aware of, and ... is strong enough to act upon." Id. at
16. He equates "hunches" with "gut feeling[s]" or "intuition[s]." Id.
247 See id. at 13-19 (defending this point, though, in my view, Gigerenzer takes it too far in
connection with policing); supra note 208 and accompanying text (criticizing aspects of Gigerenzer's
view of police hunches).
24s See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-28 (recognizing crime-control benefits of police being able to
stop crime before harm occurs, but still requiring reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
to justify stopping someone as essential to constraining police officer discretion); KLEIN, supra note
5, at 18-47 (summarizing the benefits of intuitions or hunches).
249 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-28, 30-31 (requiring mere "reasonable suspicion" to stop
someone); TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 348-49 (defining reasonable suspicion's quantitative
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try to get "good enough" results in an environment in which information and
analysis of it are costly.25 0  Doing good enough turns on crafting plausible
stories.251 Such stories may have their roots in the subconscious, but they can be
explained to third parties.252 Intuition is, therefore, essential to good police
work,2 53 but analysis to rectify intuition's pathologies is necessary too. 254  The
sections that follow thus elaborate on those pathologies and their potential cures in
an effort to minimize police error without hamstringing the police in doing their
job of enforcing the law.
B. Minimizing the Costs and Maximizing the Benefits ofIntuition
1. Heuristics
i. The Fundamental Attribution Error Redux
Sole reliance on intuition gives heuristics -cognitive shortcuts-free play.2 55
We discussed one such heuristic, the fundamental attribution error, above in
component as significantly below a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that police can still
legally stop someone who is more likely innocent than guilty).
250 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON
RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETTING 204-05 (1957) (coining the term "satisficing" and
defining it); see KLEIN, supra note 5, at 87 (noting that satisficing is a common strategy for
laypersons and experts).
251 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 91 ("[A]ction scripts are hunches for how to decide.").
252 See id. at 36 (explaining how good decision making that draws on tacit knowledge always
has a more conscious, articulable component). Klein, of course, acknowledges that it may take
"special talent to describe tacit knowledge because people have difficulty articulating it." Id. at 42.
But Klein next describes a technique known as "cognitive task analysis," id., based on the work of
Carnegie Mellon University psychology professor James Staszewski on how to train experts in the
articulation of tacit knowledge. See James J. Staszewski, Cognitive Engineering Based on Expert
Skill: Notes on Success and Surprises, in NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING AND MACROCOGNITION
317 (Jan Maarten Schraagen et al. eds., 2008). For example, Staszewski identified a few experts on
landmine detection, including Floyd Rockwell. Rockwell had trouble explaining his phenomenal
success, so Staszewski "watched him in action, prompting him to think aloud as much as possible."
KLEIN, supra note 5, at 43. From this cognitive task analytical procedure, Staszewski was able to
identify Rockwell's "secrets" and impart them to other Army engineers, including via training drills
to make the principles real. Id. The result: the Army's newly trained personnel raised their mine-
detection rate from a maximum of 20% to over 90% and Rockwell could now readily articulate his
own "secrets." Id.
253 See GIGERENZER, supra note 208, at 13-19.
254 See supra notes 184-208 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 318-420.
255 See GIGERENZER, supra note 208, at 18 (equating the "colloquial rule of thumb" with the
"scientific term heuristic," and describing heuristics as taking advantage of evolved capacities of the
brain in explaining how intuition works). A heuristic "is quite different from a balance sheet with
pros and cons; it tries to hit at the most important information and ignores the rest." Id.
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analyzing the causes of flawed first impressions.256 That heuristic prods persons,
particularly those raised in Western culture, to attribute others' behavior more to
their personalities than to their situations.257 Moreover, observers are willing to
make dispositional (character-based) judgments on little information.2 58
Additionally, the "devil's horn" effect leads observers, like police, to generalize
one bad trait, treating the entirety of the observed individual's character as
tainted.259  Such judgments can infect police decision making, leading them to
believe that certain individuals about whom they know relatively little are guilty of
something. The officers' job becomes discovering what that something is and how
each individual is hiding it. 260 The result can make an officer too willing to believe
untrustworthy snitch reports and to use overly aggressive interrogation or other
investigative techniques that may ensnare the innocent.261 This combination of
factors can lead to tunnel vision, in which police too quickly focus on a single
suspect, readily excluding others as even potential alternative perpetrators.262
As noted above, facial characteristics can amplify the fundamental attribution
error's impact on police.263 "His face doesn't fit" or "I didn't like the look of him"
are scientifically unsupportable indicators of guilt.2 64 Yet police make these sorts
ofjudgments often, further perpetuating stereotypes.265
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic may also influence police judgments.
This heuristic adjusts a plausible answer to a problem by hovering around an initial
judgment or impression known as the "anchor." 26 6  Thus, if you ask subjects
whether Mahatma Gandhi was over or under 140 years of age at the time of his
assassination (the "prime question"), then ask them to guess what Gandhi's precise
age was upon his death, the second question will elicit considerably higher answers
256 See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 67-75; KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 138
(defining the fundamental attribution error as "assuming that another does what he does because
that's just his nature, whereas I respond appropriately to the situation").
258 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
260 See Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1110-11 (discussing police tunnel vision).
261 See id. at 1110-12.
262 Id. at 1110-11; MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSsiN, THINK TWICE: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
COUNTERINTUITION 18 (2009) (defining tunnel vision as "an insufficient consideration of
alternatives").
263 See supra text accompanying notes 76-98.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 76-98.
265 See AINSWORTH, supra note 155, at 7 ("[M]ost perceivers will also go beyond this basic
information [of a person's sex, age, and race] and try to assess aspects of the other person's
personality or character from their facial appearance. Police officers may believe that they have more
skill than most in differentiating between an 'honest' and a 'dishonest' face, although . . . such
presumptions may be ill founded.").
266 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 17-18, 20-22.
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than if the prime question had suggested a much lower starting place.267 Police
primed with anchors-for example, overestimating the crime rate in a
neighborhood, the relative dangerousness of persons of certain races, or the
criminal reputation of an individual-may be more suspicious than a more
balanced weighing of the evidence warrants.268
ii. Framing
The framing heuristic can likewise bias judgments. 2 69  How a problem is
framed can alter its answer. 270 For example, experimental subjects were given
descriptions of parents A and B, each description containing equal numbers and
intensity of good and bad parenting characteristics. 271 The experimenters
instructed the subjects to sit as a jury in a custody hearing.272 When asked whether
to "award" B custody over A, most subjects chose B because of B's positive
parenting qualities.273 But when asked whether to "deny" B custody, subjects
instead focused on B's negative parenting qualities, accordingly choosing A.274
Local police culture, or individual officers' styles or the management styles of
their superiors, may play a role here. 27 5 An officer asked to "get this scumbag," for
example, may be primed to focus only on indicators of the "scumbag's" guilt.2 76
An officer asked in a more dispassionate manner to pursue leads combined with a
more open-minded local law enforcement culture might see more of the evidence
267 See Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 437, 437-43 (1997)
(using the Mahatma Gandhi and other tests of this heuristic); KLEIN, supra note 5, at 49-50
(summarizing the Strack and Mussweiler study).
268 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 155-56 (discussing police ideas about alleged
"high-crime" neighborhoods); PETER K. B. ST. JEAN, POCKETS OF CRIME: BROKEN WINDOWS,
COLLECTIVE EFFICACY, AND THE CRIMINAL POINT OF VIEW (2007) (offering an extended explanation
of why police conceptions of entire neighborhoods as "high crime" are often wrong); Taslitz, supra
note 27, at 1097-1106 (discussing flawed police perceptions of racial dangerousness and the roles of
gossip and reputation in fostering police suspicion).
269 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 51-52 (illustrating the framing heuristic); MAUBOUSSIN, supra
note 262, at 62-64 (explaining that how choices are framed affects decisions and illustrating the
point).
270 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 62-64.
271 The experiment summarized here is from Eldar Shafir, Choosing Versus Rejecting: Why
Some Options Are Both Better and Worse Than Others, 21 MEMORY & COGNITION 546, 549 (1993).
272 id.
273 Id.
274 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 51-53 (concisely summarizing this and other studies).
275 See DAVID A. HARRIS, GOOD Cops: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 84-85, 133-34,
154-71 (2005).
276 The "scumbag" reference is one that I have heard repeatedly on numerous television shows
and in movies about the police and aptly captures the sort of cultural attitude of some police
departments.
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on both sides of the question of whether a specific individual committed a
particular crime.27
iii. The Representativeness Heuristic
Another common heuristic that may be at work in policing is the
"representativeness heuristic."278 This shortcut judges persons based on salient
qualities seen as making them representative of a group rather than based on
logic. 2 79 Professors Tversky and Kahneman 2 80 famously asked subjects which of
the following two conclusions was more probable:
1. Linda is a bank teller
2. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.2 8 1
Before making their decisions, the subjects were told that Linda majored in
-philosophy, was deeply concerned with discrimination and social justice as a
college student, including participating in antinuclear demonstrations, and was
now thirty-one years old.2 82 Most subjects chose the second statement-that Linda
was a feminist bank teller-as more probable than the first one, which simply
declared that she was a bank teller.283 Yet that judgment is flawed because there
are surely more bank tellers than feminist ones. Even if all bank tellers were
feminists, a highly unlikely situation, it would not be more probable that Linda was
a feminist bank teller than a bank teller.2 8 Police are equally likely to view, for
277 See HARRIS, supra note 275, at 84-85, 133-34, 155-71 (explaining the importance of local
police culture); infra text accompanying notes 324-45 (promoting open-mindedness).
278 MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 22.
279 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 53.
280 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
281 KLEIN, supra note 5, at 53 (summarizing this experiment).
282 id
283 id
284 See id. Gerd Gigerenzer challenges this interpretation of the Tversky-Kahneman bank
teller experiment. Gigerenzer reasoned that conversational participants assume that their partner has
given them relevant information, so they interpret the ambiguous word "probable" in the original
experiment simply to mean "plausible." GIGERENZER, supra note 208, at 95. Accordingly,
Gigerenzer did his own experiment using the same descriptions of Linda the bank teller, but telling
participants that there are a hundred persons fitting Linda's description and asking "how many" of
them are bank tellers and "how many" bank tellers are active in the feminist movement. Id. at 96-97.
This time the apparent logical fallacy of treating a subset (feminist bank tellers) as occurring more
frequently than the full set (bank tellers) disappeared. Id. But Gigerenzer's experiment is irrelevant
for my purposes here, which is to discuss cognitive dangers in ambiguous situations (Gigerenzer
eliminated the ambiguity). In any event, Gigerenzer and colleagues themselves conducted another
experiment interpreted by other analysts as showing the representativeness heuristic at work and
leading to other logical errors. See Gerd Gigerenzer et al., AIDS Counselling for Low-Risk Clients,
10 AIDS CARE 197 (1998); KLEIN, supra note 5, at 53-54 (interpreting Gigerenzer and colleagues'
study). AIDS tests used at the time were good at detecting HIV (the virus causing AIDS) but had
high false positive rates. Id. Gigerenzer and his team sent a low-risk male client for HIV testing at
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example, a young male dressed in scruffy clothes with unkempt hair as
"representative" of a group-hoods defiant of social honesty norms-without
inquiring into "base rates" (the number of unkempt, scruffy young males who
comnit crime versus those who do not).285
iv. The Availability Heuristic
Police may also fall victim to the "availability heuristic," judging an event's
probability based on what images or data are most readily available in an
individual's memory.286 The recency or emotional vividness of an experience
might make it easily accessible to memory, an accessibility thoroughly
independent of the event's frequency.287 Thus, an officer recently involved in
gunfire with an African-American male youth gang might, the next day,
overestimate the likely dangerousness of other young men similar in appearance
because of the vivid, recent memory of the shootout.288
v. Flawed Extrapolation from the Past
Police may also suffer from inappropriately extrapolating from past results
when they have insufficient information to identify a trend or an important factual
distinction.289 This unwarranted tendency to extrapolate may explain the
conflicting nature of so many police profiles. For example, one profile might
identify speeding as suspicious, while another might identify rigid adherence to
speed limits as a cause for concern.290 Courts too rarely inquire into the bases for
twenty German public health centers. Id. at 54. Fifteen of the twenty trained counselors told the
patient that a positive test result would almost definitely mean that he had HIV when, in fact, low-risk
men testing positive had only a fifty percent chance of being infected. Id. Apparently, knowing that
the HIV-infected patients almost always test positive and finding probability data confusing, the
counselors relied on the HIV-infected as a class as most representative of the meaning of the positive
test. Id.
285 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 153-54.
286 MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 22 (defining this heuristic).
287 See id. at 23 ("We tend to give too much weight to the probability of something if we have
seen it recently or if it is vivid in our mind."). This heuristic, like the representativeness one,
"encourages us to ignore alternatives." Id.
288 This example is mine. See also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN:
PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 11, 13, 62, 175-99 (2003) (exploring racial bias
and police use of deadly force).
289 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 24; see also JASON ZWEIG, YOUR MONEY AND YOUR
BRAiN: HOW THE NEw SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS CAN HELP MAKE You RIcH 69-71 (2007)
(describing a Duke University experiment in which subjects were shown what they were told would
be random patterns of circles and squares, yet, after seeing only two symbols in a row come up the
same, subjects automatically expected the third symbol to do so, finding a "trend" in but two identical
symbol occurrences).
290 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 354-56.
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profiles, and many may stem from individual officer or policing unit experience.29 1
Each person or unit may generalize from that experience based upon too small a
sample and with an inadequate basis for judging its typicality.292 The problem may
be worsened-both in creating the profile and in applying it to particular cases-
by the "confirmation" and "hindsight" biases.293 The confirmation bias is the
tendency to seek information confirming a prior belief while disregarding or
minimizing disconfirming evidence. 294  The hindsight bias is the tendency to
remember things in hindsight as if they were known at the moment of decision.295
Thus, a search uncovering contraband may be remembered in a way creating more
confidence in finding such contraband at the time the officer decided to search than
was in fact the case.296 That success may be remembered as confirming certain
individual behaviors as indicative of guilt while many failed searches under similar
circumstances are forgotten or minimized.297
291 See id. at 356-58; David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense" in
the Fight Against Terror?, 17 CRIM. JUST. 36 (2002); Margie Paris, A Primer in Profiling: The
Merger of Civil Rights and Criminal Defense, 15 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2000).
292 See HARRIs, supra note 31, at 84-90; cf Scott A. Huettel et al., Perceiving Patterns in
Random Series: Dynamic Processing of Sequence in Prefrontal Cortex, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE
485, 485-90 (2002) (arguing that evolution fostered a deep-seated desire to find patterns to aid in
predictions, patterns that may often have matched reality in the world in which the desire evolved,
but that may do so far less often in our modern, technological world).
293 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 27, 35.
294 Id. at 27.
295 Id. at 35 ("We humans have an odd tendency: once an event has passed, we believe we
knew more about the outcome beforehand than we really did.").
296 Cf TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 236 (discussing effect of hindsight bias on judges
making the probable cause determination, thus making it preferable for judges to make that
determination in advance, before they know whether what they seek will be found, as occurs with
warrant-as opposed to warrantless-searches); Slobogin, supra note 128, at 376 n.41 (explaining
"hindsight bias" and summarizing the empirical evidence in support of it).
297 Another bias that might be at work is the self-justification bias, that is, our great need to
rationalize our decisions. See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 25. The need arises from our
discomfort with "cognitive dissonance," a person holding "two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs,
opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent." CAROL TAvIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES
WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL
ACTS 13 (2007). Thus an officer who believes he has a special ability to spot crime because of his
training and seeks to help the local community, believing himself to harbor no racial hatred, might
face cognitive dissonance if confronted with evidence that a profile he relies upon has an unjustified
disparate racial impact and a high error rate. To resolve this dissonance, he must contrive arguments
dismissing the disparity's existence, justifying it, or ignoring or crafting arguments to reject evidence
of the high error rate. This seems to me one plausible way to explain why so many police can trust
profiles that are both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with others used by equally confident
additional officers or departments.
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vi. Do Heuristics Play a Pernicious Role in the "Real World" of
Policing?
There is a conflict among researchers over how powerful a role heuristics play
in the "real," as opposed to experimental, world and whether that role is
desirable.298 Critics emphasize that heuristics arose because they worked often
enough to be evolutionarily advantageous.299 Critics also cite studies showing a
diminished or evaporated impact of certain heuristics in the reasoning of at least
300
some experts in their daily practice.
However, there are several reasons to believe that heuristics play a
powerful-and potentially pernicious-role in policing. First, stress tends to
magnify heuristics' power, and police officers confronting suspects are in just such
stressful situations. 3 0 1 Stress also clips individuals' ability to think long-term,
302
narrowing their vision. Second, many officers crave excitement, attracting them
to stressful circumstances, even sometimes prodding them to create stressful
situations. 30 3 Third, the pseudo-militaristic culture of many police departments and
units encourages a "them/us" dichotomous style of thinking. 0 "They" are the bad
(dishonest, dangerous) guys, and "we" are the good guys. 30 5 That sort of thinking
frequently activates resorting to stereotyping, sometimes of the crudest sort, even
in the face of stereotype-contradicting evidence.306 Fourth, police often work in
racial minority communities.307 There is ample evidence that many police at least
subconsciously buy into dark skin color or other phenotypical features associated
308
with racial minority status as indicators of dangerousness. Fifth, the most
careful critics of the experimental heuristics research concede that heuristics likely
298 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 55.
299 See id. at 56-57 (discussing some of the cognitive advantages of heuristics); GIGERENZER,
supra note 208, at 54-69 (explaining the evolutionary roots of heuristics).
300 KLEIN, supra note 5, at 59.
301 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 29-30.
302 Id
303 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 2.
3 See, e.g., Peter B. Kraska, Crime Control as Warfare: Language Matters, in MILITARIZING
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE
POLICE 14, 19-20 (Peter B. Kraska ed., 2001) (arguing that war and other police-embraced
militaristic metaphors lead to police and society more generally viewing criminals as insurrectionists
dangerous to national security); Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People: The Criminal Procedure
Implications of a Scatalogical Term, 39 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1383, 1395-98, 1413-19 (2007)
(discussing the causes and costs of them/us thinking among police and minority citizenry).
305 See Taslitz, supra note 304.
3 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena's D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial Esteem, 44
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 416-19 (2009).
307 See Taslitz, supra note 28, at 15-17, 22-26, 40, 90, 94, 99.
308 See Taslitz, supra note 170, at 124-33.
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play some role in the exercise of professional expertise, and it is important to limit
that role to a beneficent one.309
Finally, police seem to craft their own cognitive shortcuts or engage in a
semi-conscious or fully conscious analogous process of shortcut creation. As one
former officer reports, "high-crime areas" for police include streets, cars, concerts,
parks, and playgrounds, and "mid-crime areas" include schools, stores, and
airports.3 10  Police view individual behavior in high-crime areas in a more
suspicious light, 31 a judgment that the United States Supreme Court validates,
generally with little serious inquiry into the legitimacy of the "high[-]crime"
label.312 Yet the breadth of these locations gives police enormous discretion.313
Police also label as high-crime areas other locations with which most persons
would intuitively agree: housing projects, "gang" neighborhoods, and gambling
joints.314 Yet empirical research suggests, at least as to entire neighborhoods, that
311police officers' intuitive judgments may be wrong. Most of the "high crime" in
neighborhoods is in fact limited to certain blocks.3 16 In addition, the precise
location of these blocks can be identified and predicted with more effective police
data-gathering techniques and often boiled down to a few markers making
worrisome locations readily identifiable.1
vii. Reducing Heuristics' Negative Impact
a. Improved Information and Training
Several sorts of techniques can help to reduce the negative impacts of
heuristics and their more conscious shortcut cousins, profiles and high-crime-area
stereotypes. Computerized data gathering and other enhanced data collection and
analysis techniques can substitute more accurate anchors (the true rate of
criminality in a location, for example) and frames for less accurate ones. 18 Such
309 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 61-66.
310 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 156.
311 See id.
312 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2293-2304.
313 See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character
ofthe Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99 (1999).
314 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 156.
315 See ST. JEAN, supra note 268.
316 See id. at 5, 22-24, 217-18.
" See id. at 5, 22-24, 211, 217-18.
318 See generally WALKER, supra note 218, at 100-34 (discussing "early intervention"
programs improving individual police officer performance, data collection strategies to inform those
programs, and their similarity to COMPSTAT, a computer-based effort to systematically collect data on
crime and disorder in a search for patterns to guide ongoing changes in police strategy and tactics);
JAMES J. WILLIS ET AL., THE POLICE FOUNDATION, COMPSTAT AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
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data can help to make a police officer aware of base rates and help her to second-
guess her "gut" without ignoring it. Better information on which heuristics can
operate is an important strategy because merely pointing out the influence of
heuristics and their dangers alone does little to alleviate them.319 Experts tend to
resist such debiasing efforts because they are skeptical of the relevance of lab
results to the real world, the uncertainty and ambiguity of expert practice make
chance seem to be a bigger contributor to error than bias, and they have little
confidence that "egghead"-suggested debiasing techniques will help.320
Moreover, the police, like many professionals, are likely over time to see
categories of cases rather than unique individuals or situations.3 2 1 They prefer the
security of what they know: the comfort of stereotypes and shortcuts in an
otherwise frightening and incomprehensible world.322 As one commentator put it,
"[p]rofiling by stereotype ignores a person's individuality, but so what? Cops
decide whether to pull over a car or stop someone on the street in a split second.
When cops stop you, [they are] not trying to imbibe the wondrous fullness of your
being."3 23
Improved information and training practices might also help police to adopt
the "outside view." 324 Rather than relying solely on police intuition regarding what
patterns exist and what suspect behavior reveals (the "inside view"), they can look
at the results of an objective examination of data to see what patterns it will in fact
IN THE LOWELL POLICE DEPARTMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2003),
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/compstat.pdf.
319 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 61 (noting that poor data produces inaccurate results, regardless
of the reasoning strategy); id. at 62 (recommending building more accurate anchors, frames, and
mental models rather than trying to replace these heuristics altogether); id. at 64 (noting that
awareness of base rates helps to improve estimates, even among children).
320 See id. at 120-21 (focusing on algorithms or other methods to debias by replacing partly
intuitive reasoning strategies with more automated ones). However, "we aren't comfortable with
letting decision analysts or techniques usurp our decision authority." Id. at 121. "We are responsible
for the outcomes, not the analyst or the method." Id. Professor Raanan Lipshitz of Haifa University
was quoted as saying, "Low to high ranking executives have consistently stated that they had no use
for the formal models to which they had been exposed in a variety of university and executive
development courses." Id. See J. Frank Yates et al., Hard Decisions, Bad Decisions: On Decision
Quality and Decision Aiding, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 13,
34 (Sandra L. Schneider & James Shanteau eds., 2003) ("[W]e have seen little evidence that
debiasing techniques are frequently employed in actual practice.").
321 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 1-2) (summarizing the need for an enhanced
individualized suspicion requirement to govern police); Taslitz, supra note 36, at 14-24 (explaining
many of the institutional and psychological forces that move criminal justice decision makers toward
de-individualized justice).
322 See Taslitz, supra note 36, at 14-24.
323 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 117.
324 See Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Undermines
Executives'Decisions, 81 HARV. BUS. REv. 56 (2003) (articulating the "outside view" strategy).
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reveal (the "outside view").325 Repeated, vivid presentation of such data,
combined with guidelines on its use and a proper reward structure for relying on
that data, can help to change behavior.3 26 Vigorous efforts of this sort are required
because three illusions build resistance to persons adopting the outside view:
overconfidence, optimism, and control.327
Most people are overly confident in their abilities.328  Thus most persons
consider themselves "above average" drivers or leaders when that cannot
mathematically be true." 3 29  Even when acknowledging evidence of their
shortcomings, most people tend to dismiss them as inconsequential in undermining
their overall high opinion of their skills.330 Yet, perhaps paradoxically, the poorest
performers at a task tend to most dramatically overstate their abilities. 33'
Most people are also optimists, seeing their future as likely brighter than that
of others, and most of us behave as if we can control chance events, such as
winning the lottery.332 As cognitive psychologist Daniel Gilbert notes, most
people think of themselves as different from and better than others.333
Additionally, people's natural tendency is to base decisions on accumulated
anecdotes rather than evidence. But anecdotes contribute to the inside rather than
the outside view.334
325 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 63-64 (arguing that changing the format in which data is
presented into forms more natural for people improves their ability to use that data effectively).
326 See infra text accompanying notes 421-33 (discussing reward structures, guidelines,
vividness, and repetition); KEITH E. STANOVICH, WHAT INTELLIGENCE TESTS Miss: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF RATIONAL THOUGHT 75-78 (2009) (discussing "disrationalia" resulting from vividness biases).
327 MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 4-6; Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and
Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988)
(analyzing these illusions in greater detail).
328 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 4-6.
329 See Mark D. Alicke & Olesya Govorun, The Better-Than-Average Effect, in THE SELF IN
SOCIAL JUDGMENT 85, 87 (Mark D. Alicke et al. eds., 2005) (discussing overconfidence in driving,
sports, leadership, and getting along with others); MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 4-5 (discussing
overconfidence in ability to judge humor).
330 MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 5.
331 Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1121, 1122-23 (1999).
332 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 6; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 818 (1980) (illustrating this point in a
study showing most students believed they were more likely to have good, and less likely to have
bad, experiences than their peers).
3 DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 229 (2006).
334 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 8-10; Angela K. Freymuth & George F. Ronan,
Modeling Patient Decision-Making: The Role of Base-Rate and Anecdotal Information, 11 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. MED. SETTINGS 211, 215 (2004) (noting undue influence of anecdotes on patient
decision making).
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None of these cognitive habits imprison persons within the inside view.335
However, they do require persistence and energy to achieve a cognitive
jailbreak. 3 6
Another cognitive psychologist, Keith Stanovich, argues that intelligent
people's cognitive performance can be improved by telling them in advance how
to reason.3 Stanovich recommends three corrective steps: (1) teach people
common cognitive errors; (2) promote "situational awareness," recognition of the
problem in the context in which it arises; and (3) teach them a mental tool set to
keep inappropriate intuitions in check. 338 This combination must be designed to
explode false beliefs, calibrate judgments with the evidence, encourage honest
introspection, and promote mental flexibility.339
I would add several points. Notably, significant research suggests that
persons will do better at overcoming biases if they are not simply made aware of
them, but also offered explanations of why persons often resist abandoning them.340
Furthermore, even when the subconscious is inaccessible to conscious thought,
changing conscious behavior can, over time, alter the unconscious. 34 1 Training
must thus go beyond providing police with new information to role-playing and
stricter monitoring of field behavior, where feasible.342 Additionally, some
cognitions, particularly certain emotional ones, are more easily accessible to the
conscious mind with proper training.34 3
Furthermore, because mental models-stories-play such an important role in
human judgment, police departments must work to enrich those models.
33s See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 3-13.
336 Speaking of the influence of heuristics more generally, Gary Klein, a thinker who argues
that laboratory research often overstates systematic errors caused by heuristics, that jettisoning
heuristics entirely can have unintended ill consequences, that too much of the biases research
involves novices and ignores context, and that heuristics are often useful in everyday life, concedes
that in practice they also sometimes lead to "severe and systematic errors." KLEIN, supra note 5, at
56. Yet Klein also argues that many of the strategies discussed above can correct for heuristics'
baleful influences and that the goal of research and reform should be to improve the quality of tacit
judgment rather than to displace it entirely. See id. at 62-66, 121.
33 See STANOVICH, supra note 326, at 99-100.
331 See id. at 99-100, 124, 128, 150-51, 167-79, 199-208, 211-12; MAUBOUSSIN, supra note
262, at xv-xvii (discussing corrective lessons to be learned from Stanovich and his intellectual
cousins).
3 See MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at xv-xvii (making similar points, albeit using slightly
different language).
340 See ANDREw E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 133 (1999).
341 See Taslitz, supra note 12, at 177-78.
342 Cf id
343 See id. at 176-78. Emotions turn on cognitions. For example, someone fears a snake only
by first indentifying an object as a snake, then concluding that snakes are dangerous. See Taslitz,
supra note I10, at 442-43.
3" See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 62 (noting importance of improving experts' performance by
giving them richer mental models).
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Training, daily police culture, enhanced community interaction, empathy exercises,
and a proper reward system may all work to enhance the library of narratives
resident in the police officer's mind.345
b. Of Operational Changes and Paradoxes
I am not here suggesting any particular police training program. I am merely
making the point that law enforcement institutions, research suggests, should be
able to improve police officer accuracy through operational changes and revised
training programs to educate police intuition rather than replace it and complement
it with more systematic forms of reasoning.346 Educated intuition and improved
guidelines can enhance police performance even in split-second decisions because
intuition will still be at work.347 Where more time is available, police will have
more opportunities to give systematic thought a greater-but not necessarily
dominant-role, a point on which I will elaborate shortly.348 More time permits
more opportunities for police to investigate and evaluate complex situations, time
urgency being another condition that can enhance the influence of sometimes-
flawed stereotypes, and a dearth of information likewise replaces conscious
judgment almost entirely with heuristics that may be an inappropriate fit for the
circumstances.349
I want to note a seeming paradox. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause
require individualized judgment.3'0 But part of what I am suggesting here is to
permit more informed generalizations to play a role. Some use of generalizations
is unavoidable in human reasoning, so no reasoning is purely individualized or
purely generalized. 351 Rather, there is a spectrum, and the reasonable suspicion
and probable cause concepts should be understood as favoring the more
individualized end of that spectrum.352 I am not, therefore, arguing that
generalizations alone can constitute reasonable suspicion, though the Court finds
345 See HARRIS, supra note 275 (generally discussing training and police accountability
strategies and effect of reward systems on police biases); HARRIS, supra note 31, at 169-75
(discussing training to address subconscious or systemic causes of biased policing); Andrew E.
Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 291-94 (2003) (discussing police culture); Taslitz, supra note 28,
at 22-26 (discussing community interaction); infra text accompanying notes 421-27.
346 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
347 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 309-12 (discussing use of force policies).
348 See infra text accompanying notes 379-401.
349 See infra text accompanying notes 379-401.
350 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 1-2).
351 See id. (manuscript at 18-19, 24).
352 See id.
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that at least some generalizations are sufficient to do so.3  Because
generalizations must unavoidably play some role, however, I am arguing that
reasonable efforts be made to select apt generalizations, ones supported by as
much empirical data as are reasonably available that are a good "fit" for the
situation. By "fit" I mean using the right generalization-the one most likely
accurate in a particular case and, therefore, in a sense, an individualized judgment
about that case. 354
Finally, I have also sought in this subsection to make the point that the risks
of error from heuristics are sufficiently great as to counsel against too-hasty
deference to police hunches and intuition. Although intuition can and should play
a role, it must be subject to correctives, including the officer's ability to expressly
justify his actions to third parties on more objective grounds, the final point of this
section, to which I next turn.
c. Explanation as Bias Correction
Motivated reasoning-the desire to achieve a particular outcome-has
pernicious effects on human judgment, including expert judgment."' Without
motivation, of course, humans would take no action.356 But what motivates us
influences what we perceive in the first place as well as what we make of these
perceptions.357 Motivation affects where we direct our attention and what we see
as important.58 Indeed, motivations affecting what we perceive and how we
interpret perceptions arise before we have any information, before we observe,
remember, and plan.5 Motivated reasoning thus encourages selective perception
and memory, seeing and remembering only the data that confirms our prejudice,360
and leads to self-deception.36 1 But there is at least a partial cure for the ills of
motivated reasoning, as two commentators explain:
3 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000) (finding the generalization that flight
from the police in a high-crime neighborhood reflects consciousness of guilt sufficient to support
reasonable suspicion, justifying a stop); Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2299-2302.
354 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 24, 35).
3ss See KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 134-36.
356 See id. at 136.
3 See id.
358 See id
3 See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990)
(surveying the literature supporting this point).
3 KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 137.
361 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 381, 381-98 (2005).
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Fortunately, there is a . . . method for achieving accuracy . . . .
Psychological studies where the subjects, having made a decision, must
then explain their thought process to others, or must commit themselves
to the consequences of their choice (by, for example, having their views
published), show that when we have to justify our reasoning, we
disengage it from our prior motivation and suddenly start thinking much
more like scientists. We consider more alternatives, admit more
complexity, devise better tests for determining cause and effect. We fall
less into what's provocatively called the fundamental attribution error:
assuming that another does what he does because that's just his nature,
whereas I respond appropriately to the situation. The most powerful
technique for avoiding motivated reasoning turns out to be imagining
how you would argue the other side.362
For example, a hospital's asking its pediatricians voluntarily to explain why
they chose to perform each cesarean section-with no sanction being imposed for
whatever answer they gave-alone resulted in cesarean rates dropping
dramatically from 17.5% to 11. 5%.363 This drop resulted in no increased patient
risk, demonstrating that the pre-justification rates subjected far too many women to
an unnecessary and serious medical procedure.3 6 Likewise, asking gay men to
record why they had unprotected sex alone greatly reduced its occurrence. 365
There is no reason to believe that the power of explanation to reduce
motivated reasoning and its associated frequent pathologies should be any less for
police than doctors, gay men, or the other groups for which research studies have
been done.366 This observation alone justifies avoiding simple deference to police
judgment and requiring police to explain their search and seizure decisions,
whether through warrant affidavits or during suppression hearings. As two recent
writers on the subject of motivated reasoning note, "Explaining yourself, admitting
other possibilities, thinking like the other fellow-these take us a long way from
the flow experience [of non-introspective immersion in the moment], but they
bring the world as a whole much closer to safety." 3 67 Just so.
362 KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 138.
363 Stephen A. Myers & Norbert Gleicher, A Successful Program to Lower Cesarean-Section
Rates, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1511 (1988).
3 KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 139.
365 See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 286-87 (1996); see also supra note 195
(citing additional studies on the debiasing power of explanation).
36 See supra note 365; infra notes 454-81 and accompanying text (summarizing many of the
studies).
367 KAPLAN & KAPLAN, supra note 2, at 138-39; see id. at 129 (defining the "flow experience"
of harmonious action, drawing on the work of psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi).
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d. Blending Intuition and Systematic Reasoning
Experts generally do not start answering a question, solving a problem, or
conducting an investigation by exhaustively listing all possible options. Rather,
their experiences lead them to focus, at least initially, on some aspects of a
situation more than others.369 They review these cues to search for patterns leading
to hypotheses. 370 Relying on their hunches about what matters and why gets them
started.37'
However, well-respected researchers in practical decision making argue that
hunches do not and should not end the matter.3 72  Experts must use their
imaginations, drawing on their stock of mental models, to simulate what would
happen if they followed their initial instincts.7 Experience and intuition aid the
imagination, but the act of imaginative testing is also a decidedly conscious one, so
its outcomes can be explained to others.374 If the outcomes are not adequate, the
expert relies on intuition to craft an alternative hypothesis, imaginatively testing it
as well.7 When a hypothesis is found that adequately survives testing, existing
mental models generate action scripts-guides to choice of decision and resulting
behavior.376 This model is called "Recognition Primed Decision"7 [RPD], and it
can be diagramatically represented thus:378
368 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 83, 94.
369 See id. at 94-95.
370 See id. at 88-91.
371 Id. at 91. It is thus the novices who carefully list and deliberate among options rather than
testing the first option that hits them as making sense. See Raanan Lipshitz & Orit Ben Shaul,
Schemata and Mental Models in Recognition-Primed Decision Making, in NATURALISTIC DECISION
MAKING 293, 295 (Caroline E. Zsambok & Gary Klein eds., 1997).
372 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 90-91.
3 See id.
374 See id. at 91 ("The pattern matching is the intuitive part, and the mental simulation is the
deliberate analysis.").
375 See id. at 90.
376 See id. at 90-92, 96-98.
37 Gary A. Klein et al., Rapid Decision Making on the Fire Ground, 1 PROC. OF THE HUM.
FACTORS Soc'Y: 30TH ANN. MEETING 576, 579 (1986) (coining the term).
378 KLEIN, supra note 5, at 90, is the source for this diagram.
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This model makes sense in emergency situations, such as in the midst of
fighting a fire, choosing where to land a defective airplane, or stopping a
dangerous fleeing suspect. 379 But where time allows-even modestly more time-
imaginative testing alone is insufficient. Experts will still intuitively form a
tentative primary hypothesis, where feasible, to explain their observations. But, as
time permits, they must empirically test the hypothesis rather than merely
imaginatively doing So.380
For example, in one simulation, a group of anesthesiologists discovered that a
mannequin's breathing tube was not working properly.38  Indeed, the
experimenters had created an unusual cause for the problem.382 One group of
anesthesiologists merely stalled, unable to generate a diagnosis, unwilling to try
alternative treatments.383 A second group fixated on the most obvious diagnosis
and, when it failed, merely stuck to variations on that (still useless) theme.384 A
379 See id. at 87 (noting that his "RPD" decision-making model is particularly apt where actors
face "some time pressure and uncertainty"); id at 88-93 (reviewing real world examples of the
model in action).
380 See id. at 152-54 (arguing for a "speculate-and-test strategy" where empirical testing of a
sort is available).
381 See Jenny W. Rudolph, Into the Big Muddy and Out Again: Error Persistence and Crisis
Management in the Operating Room (Aug. 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College)
(on file with O'Neil Library, Boston College).
382 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 152-54 (summarizing the study).
11 Id. at 152.
' Id at 152-53.
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third group speculated wildly through all theoretical possibilities, repeatedly
weighing the pros and cons of each without thoroughly testing them.385
But the fourth group-the "adaptive problem solvers"-used "initial
diagnoses as springboards for conducting subsequent tests and treatments."386
When one treatment failed, they turned to what was initially a next-best choice,
speculating wildly, choosing among the speculations, and then testing each one-by-
one.387 They tested in different ways: by fiber optic scopes, by the feel of the
suction catheter, by the suctioning's dry sound, and by comparing "how far they
could insert the suction catheter versus the length of the breathing tube."
Ultimately, these four testing strategies led them to the correct conclusion: a
hardened mucus plug in the breathing tube. 389 Their success turned on their
willingness to speculate-and-test each hypothesis without committing too early to
any one of them.390
Note that the anesthesiologists did not keep a thoroughly open mind. They
made best guesses, while keeping other possibilities in mind. 39 1 The guesses
formed expectancies that could be tested and falsified while heightening attention
to novel events or to the absence of expected ones.392 Simultaneously, the experts
were anticipating one hypothesis's failure and planning what to do next should that
occur.393  Continuing proactive data gathering combined with a willingness to
discard inadequate hypotheses did the job.394
A police officer, like the one in Terry v. Ohio,395 seemingly watching several
men repeatedly "casing out" a store for a robbery, may often have as much time as
anesthesiologists struggling to cure a breathing problem before a patient dies. But
the officer lacks access to the kind of ultimate testing available to the
anesthesiologists. Police might, therefore, simply act, seeing whether their
decision achieved their goal: capturing criminals. The equivalent to the





390 See id at 153-54.
391 ARTHUR S. ELSTEIN ET AL., MEDICAL PROBLEM SOLVING: AN ANALYSIS OF CLINICAL
REASONING, at ix (1978) (concluding that physicians making diagnoses immediately begin to
speculate rather than awaiting all the data).
392 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 158-59 (making this general point); id. at 159 (noting that
experts "don't necessarily see discrepancies any more quickly, but when they do spot discrepancies,
they understand their meaning more fully and can deal with them more confidently") (internal
quotation marks omitted); Karl E. Weick & Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, Mindfulness and the Quality of
Organizational Attention, 17 ORG. SCI. 514 (2006).
3 See KLEIN, supra note 5, at 158-60.
394 See id at 158-59.
. 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
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anesthesiologists' situation for an officer might thus be to stop-and-frisk persons
on a mere hunch, revealing evidence of crime or not. Such officer "testing" would,
of course, be blatantly unconstitutional.396 But that does not mean that the officer
has no means of testing his hypothesis that "they are casing the joint" short of such
unconstitutional action.
Under many circumstances, an officer can continue to observe, gathering
more data, attempting to focus in particular on data that may disconfirm his
working hypothesis. Perhaps he saw one suspect exit a car. He might have time to
call in the license plate to see whether it, or its attached car, is stolen or whether
the driver has a record. In such instances, little more than a radio call, watchful
waiting, and careful evaluation, may be required. The officer need only have
"reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity is afoot, a fairly low standard, to stop
someone.397 Yet the stop itself, though implicating the Fourth Amendment, is a
relatively modest intrusion designed to permit further data gathering-further
testing of hypotheses-before settling on one held with sufficient confidence
("probable cause") to justify more invasive action.398 The cop on the beat might
also work alone, but if she has a partner, she can at least imaginatively test ideas
with the partner, also eliciting the latter's aid in "empirically" testing them.
Police seeking search warrants, of course, are often far more likely to have
greater time to investigate suspicions. They can interview witnesses, do forensic
testing, run background checks, and brainstorm with colleagues. 399 For them, the
speculate-and-test model may make even greater sense. Indeed, because probable
cause is a more robust concept than reasonable suspicion,400 one way to give the
former concept more vigor is to associate it with a more rigorous speculate-and-
test-like duty to investigate and evaluate as an aspect of the probable cause
determination.401
The RPD model presupposes that experts are able to overcome, or at least
diminish the influence of, certain biases, such as the confirmation bias.402 That,
too, requires careful training. Such training must give feedback not on the
outcomes of individual actions (finding evidence or not), but on the process of
396 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 317-68 (explaining the Terry doctrine).
' See id. at 349-53.
398 The whole point of the Terry stop is indeed to permit "investigation" and "reasonable
inquiries" to either dispel officer suspicion or confirm it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23
(1968).
399 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 49-51 (summarizing pretrial police investigation
teaching).
400 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 2-3) (describing reasonable suspicion as
"probable cause light").
401 See infra text accompanying notes 482-548 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment duty to
investigate).
402 See supra text accompanying note 138 (discussing the confirmation bias).
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choice.403 Yet educating officers about overall outcomes of certain decision
strategies-one way of conveying the "outside view"-is wise. For example, an
officer using a drug courier profile may rejoice at successfully catching a drug
courier. 4 04 However, a profile means that the officer is looking for some things but
not others.40 5 Consequently, the officer might be missing many more drug couriers
simply because they do not fit the profile.4 06 Empirical data in the area of racial
profiling has supported exactly such a conclusion: alternative strategies catch
more, not fewer, criminal wrongdoers.407
Where relevant data is unavailable, police administrators might be advised to
systematically encourage both (profiling and non-profiling) strategies, comparing
the results, that is, engaging in their own data gathering. Alternatively, assume
that an officer using a drug courier profile finds evidence of drug possession or
distribution in 5% of the cases where he stops suspects matching the profile.40 8
The officer might be quite pleased by this outcome.409 But does a strategy that
proves correct only 5% of the time establish "reasonable suspicion" for the stop in
the first place? There is a precedent-based argument that the answer to this
question is "no."41o The answer is ultimately, of course, a normative one, and the
403 See, e.g., KLEIN, supra note 5, at 166 ("To improve, we need process feedback about the
way we are acting."); id. at 173 ("For cognitive skills, we want feedback to change the way we think,
not just add more facts into our memory."); id. at 174-76 (explaining the necessity of feedback that is
clear, actively involves the learner in the feedback process, will not be distorted in memory, and that
challenges our mental models). It is important to note that the RPD and speculate-and-test strategies
try to marry the quick, automatic, subconscious system of thinking and the slower, more flexible
conscious system of thinking. See id at 93-94; Marvin S. Cohen et al., Critical Thinking Skills in
Tactical Decision Making: A Model and a Training Strategy, in MAKING DECISIONS UNDER STRESS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM TRAINING 155 (Janis A. Cannon-Bowers & Eduardo Salas
eds., 1998) (setting forth a program training participants in the speculate-and-test method of decision
making).
404 See AINSWORTH, supra note 155, at 10 (using similar example).
405 See id. ("The gun-carrying drug dealer whose physical appearance and demographic
characteristics do not match the template will of course go unchallenged, and as [a] result[,] the
officer may never feel a need to revise the template in the future.").
406 As police research psychologist Peter Ainsworth explains:
The officer may even feel vindicated by the fact that the person who was stopped
was in possession of a weapon or drugs and was subsequently convicted of a criminal
offence. But such a 'result' may do little to encourage the officer to look for other
dangerous individuals whose physical appearance is different from that of the majority of
people who are stopped and searched.
Id. I use "profiling" as an example to make the point starkly, but officers often rely on a tacit
"template" even if they do not use a more formal profile. See id.
407 See HARRIS, supra note 31, at 73-90 (surveying empirical data demonstrating that profiling
using race as even a factor is far less effective in identifying criminals than alternative, behavior-
focused strategies).
408 See AINSWORTH, supra note 155, at 10 (offering similar example).
4 Id.
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degree of accuracy needed to justify a search in society's eyes, or that of the
Framers, or of any other chosen politico-legal reference group, might diverge from
the degree demanded by the officer.41'
2. Situational Awareness
A decision maker's situation can, often unbeknownst to her, bias her
decision.412 Numerous such situational forces may affect police decision making.
Group conformity pressures, including discouraging the airing of views that
contradict superiors and being under the sway of influential officers or of the
prevailing sentiments of the group as a whole, can, for example, squelch the
generation of new hypotheses or cut off new, potentially fruitful areas for
investigation.413 That can mean never finding a criminal wrongdoer or finding and
prosecuting the wrong one. Indeed, tunnel vision has played an important role in
several wrongful convictions, and it is plausible that group conformity pressures
partly explain why.414 Part of the solution is to provide structured opportunities
for, and an institutional culture that encourages, dissent.415
410 The argument here is actually a complex one, but I will simplify it. The reasonable
suspicion judgment is, in theory, one particularized to this suspect. There is reason to believe that
judges read the precedent concerning the quantitative proof required to establish reasonable suspicion
as 31% likelihood of guilt or perhaps a bit less. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 348-49. But if
the judgment is truly particularized, that percentage should refer to the subjective likelihood of guilt,
that is, roughly speaking, the subjective sense of being 31% confident that this suspect is guilty of a
crime. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE
KNOw? 12, 47-49 (2005) (illustrating subjective versus objective probabilities). But reliance on
matching a profile as alone creating reasonable suspicion is a more generalized judgment, the
argument being that a suspect who matches the profile-who fits into a general category-is "X"
percent likely guilty. This judgment relies on objective likelihood or frequency notions of
probability. In other words, if we used the 31% figure for reasonable suspicion, that would mean that
one out of every three persons stopped based on a profile match would be, for example, found in
possession of drugs. A 5% accuracy rate falls well short of this one-in-three success rate. Of course,
this may be why the Court has never held that a mere mathematical match to a profile can alone
establish reasonable suspicion, but neither has the Court barred reliance on profiles. See TASLITZ ET
AL., supra note 17, at 348-53.
411 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 34-35).
412 MAuBoussIN, supra note 262, at 55, 58.
413 See id. at 55-56; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 46-73 (2007).
414 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49
How. L.J. 475, 481-83 (2006); Leona D. Jochnowitz, Book Review, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 995, 995
(2008) (reviewing JON B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2008)).
415 See MAUBOUssrN, supra note 262, at 71-72 (cautioning against the "institutional
imperative" to mindlessly imitate what peers are doing); CASS R. SUNsTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT (2003) (discussing the political benefits of dissent); Taslitz, supra note 345, at 294-95
(analyzing the dangers of certain police institutional cultures).
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Another aspect of the situation can be an officer's own personality and those
416
of others sharing his assignment. Former Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]
agent and police officer Dale Carson gives this example: "Cops [in high-crime
areas] are keyed up and on the hunt. High-crime districts attract the toughest,
wiliest, and most ambitious cops who want to lead their departments in felony
arrests, rack up points, and be first in line for promotions.""'7 Such zeal for one's
work may be admirable, but it also may lead to overzealousness. Thus, Carson
insists that some officers are "inciters," intentionally engaging in insulting or
unduly harsh behavior in the hope of promoting an angry response by a suspect,
thus justifying an otherwise unjustifiable arrest on the now arguably legitimate
grounds of disturbing the peace.418 The scandal involving the NYPD's Street
Crimes Unit, which had been stopping large numbers of young minority males
without reasonable suspicion, is a still more vivid example.419 Police superiors
ultimately had no choice but to disband the Unit.420
Incentives are also salient aspects of the decision-making environment.42 1
Local police are most often rewarded for responding to calls, making street stops
of suspicious people, and making traffic stops. 42 2 Police departments also often
reward arrests, regardless of whether they lead to prosecutions or convictions. 423
This incentive structure may foster higher numbers of police interventions than
would otherwise likely result-interventions based on minimal investigation.4 24
416 See AINSWORTH, supra note 155, at 34-45 (analyzing the importance of individual officer
personality to effective policing, and thus the need for its early consideration at the time of officer
selection).
417 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 155.
418 See id. at 142-45.
419 See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 851-52 (2008)
("Between 1997 and 1998, NYPD's elite street crime unit conducted nearly 40,000 frisks that
revealed no contraband at all. Most troubling, these rates for [B]lacks and Hispanics remain
disproportionately high even when numbers are adjusted to reflect higher offending rates in particular
neighborhoods.") (footnote omitted); David Kocieniewski, Success ofElite Police Unit Exacts a Toll
on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (noting that New York City's Street Crimes Unit
stopped tens of thousands of persons each year).
420 See William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, Police Commissioner Closing Controversial Street
Crime Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at Bl.
421 See MAUBOUssIN, supra note 262, at 31-36 (discussing how incentives, including financial
ones, can harm professional judgment and promote tunnel vision). Mauboussin counsels, in addition
to creating the right incentives, seeking dissent whenever possible; keeping track of previous
decisions to minimize hindsight bias concerning a particular tactic's value; and using base rates and
guidelines mitigating the influence of the representativeness and availability biases as additional
ways to combat tunnel vision. See id. at 34-36.
422 CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 64-65.
423 Id. at 61.
424 See id at 66-67.
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By contrast, the FBI rewards the number of quality arrests and resulting
convictions. 42 5  That incentive structure encourages a much greater degree of
investigation across the board than is true of the vast majority of cases handled by
the local police.426 Indeed, the FBI's preference is not to arrest on probable cause,
but rather to develop as strong a case as possible before acting. 427 Local police
departments lack the detectives and other resources to do more thorough
investigations in larger numbers of cases.428 However, that resource constraint is,
of course, yet another aspect of the situation that may affect decision-making
processes and outcomes, both consciously and subconsciously.
Decision theorists attentive to such things thus counsel self-conscious efforts
at awareness of situational influences and how they may encourage tunnel vision;
revamping incentive structures as much as feasible to avoid investigative blinders;
institutional structures to counter silencing stemming from the desire to be part of
the in-group; guarding against inertia (doing things one way because that is the
way they have always been done); and avoiding taking a particular course of action
because it is the "easy way out."429 They further stress the importance of focusing
on decision-making procedures and strategies rather than outcomes.430
Moreover, such a focus should help professionals separate luck from skill. 4 3 1
Such separation requires experts, here police, to be attentive to such phenomena as
"reversion to the mean" (extreme observations in isolated instances can be
misleading because, over time, repeated events will tend toward the average); the
"halo effect" (allowing observation of one good trait to lead to viewing a person as
good overall, thus not a worthy suspect); sample size; and changes in
circumstances between observations. In short, it requires police once again to
take an attitude akin to the "outside view."
4 33
3. Benefits of the Articulation Requirement
Reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts."434
Although not always so phrased, a similar requirement governs probable cause.435
425 Id. at 67.
426 See id at 67, 126.
427 See id at 67 (arguing that FBI incentive structures "direct[] them to arrest more serious
criminals, and to accumulate more evidence before making an arrest").
428 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 127.
429 MAUBOUSSIN, supra note 262, at 31-36, 66-72.
430 See id. at xx.
431 See id. at xx-xxi.
432 Id. at 120-23, 129, 132-36. Mauboussin also emphasizes the importance of training
professionals to empathize with others because a more accurate understanding of others' thoughts and
actions improves decision making. Id. at 139.
433 See id. at 1-16.
434 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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Part of the argument for deferring to police intuition is that intuition has value but,
because it works at a subconscious level, intuition simply cannot be articulated.4 36
Much of this article has demonstrated that this assertion is not necessarily so. Here
I want to amplify that argument by means of illustration, then summarize the error
reduction and related advantages of an articulation requirement.
i. Articulation of Hunch-Based Reasoning Is Possible
One real-world illustration of the point involves the manager of an offshore
oil rig.4 37 A trapped bubble of natural gas on such a rig had required a standard
response: injecting mud into the pipe to create countervailing pressure.438 But the
rig manager's "gut" prompted him to withhold the order to proceed. 439 He flew out
to the rig and ordered a systematic search for leaks or anything else suggesting that
standard procedure was unwise.440 That search indeed revealed a problem-one
that would have resulted in causing the rig to explode and kill all onboard had
standard procedure been followed."' The manager safely resolved the problem by
alternative means." 2 When later pressed for what his gut was telling him, he
"remembered that what was bothering him was the size and depth of the
bubble."" Those unusual features triggered his sense of caution.4
It might be argued, however, that the manager's later-articulated explanation
of his "gut" was a post hoc invention, an effort to make current conscious sense of
what his subconscious had already done. Yet that sense making occurred without
his having had access to his true subconscious motivations. If so, the point is
irrelevant. The bubble was of an unusual size and depth, an objective explanation
with which he likely could have justified his caution to his superiors at the time.
The manager did not know at the time what the bubble's size and shape
meant. But it triggered not alternative action to solve the problem of the bubble
but rather further investigation. That investigation revealed objective evidence that
an alternative course of action was required. Indeed, when the manager first called
his supervisor to report his intention to depart from the standard procedure, the
supervisor's response was, "Are you crazy?"" 5 But when the manager explained
435 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 92).
436 See supra text accompanying notes 38, 54-55.
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what his investigation had revealed, the supervisor agreed that an alternative
446
approach was required.
A second example involves a firehouse commander." 7 A social scientist
investigating expert decision strategies interviewed the commander, asking him to
recall difficult decisions or ones in which the commander's experience proved
critical." 5 None came to mind. The interviewer thus changed his tactic, simply
asking the commander to describe his last fire." 9 The commander did so,
characterizing the incident as a "simple house fire."450 Seeing smoke coming from
the back of the house, the commander guessed that it came from a kitchen fire,
which his inspection confirmed. Accordingly, he told his crew to enter the house
through the front door with a hose, and they did so, extinguishing the fire.451 To
the commander, no real decision needed to be made at all. 452
The interviewer, however, was surprised. Why did not the commander hit the
fire from the outside, in the back where it started, thus avoiding having his men
exposed to the danger of being inside an actively burning house?453 Here is how
the interviewer described the commander's reaction:
He looked at me with contempt. That's what a volunteer fire
department might do. The problem is that by hitting it from outside
you're going to push it into the house where it can spread in all kinds of
ways. No, it's much better to go into the house and push it outside. Of
course, if there is another exposure outside, say another building right
next to it, then you might have to do an external attack, but that's really a
last choice.454
This example too teaches important lessons. The commander was unable to
consciously access much of the content of his experience and intuition in the
abstract. When confronted with the discipline of describing a concrete, individual
incident, however, he was able to do much better. Even then, his actions had been
so automatic that he did not even bother explaining them to the interviewer. But
when the interviewer challenged the commander, the commander was readily able
to reflect on and explain the reasons for his actions. Whether the articulated
reasons were in some cosmic sense the "truly" motivating ones-and I suspect
446 Id.
44 Id. at 88.
448 Id. at 88-89 (recounting this story).





454 Id. at 88-89.
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they were-the reasons were certainly not lies. They were based upon objectively
verifiable evidence easily corroborated by the other firefighters and sufficient to
justify his actions to a third party.
There is no reason to believe that police are any different from oil rig
managers or firehouse commanders. Police, like all experts, are capable of
articulating their reasons for action in an objectively verifiable fashion permitting
those reasons' sufficiency to be judged by relevant third parties.
ii. The Virtues of Articulation
The relevant third parties who must judge the sufficiency of police reasons for
action include police superiors, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, legislators,
the media, and the general public.455 The requirement of submitting an affidavit in
support of a search or arrest warrant application provides a written statement of an
officer's justifications.456 The device of the suppression hearing, combined with
Terry's mandate that reasonable suspicion be based upon specific and articulable
facts, provides an oral statement of reasons, reducible to a transcript, reviewable in
a way similar to that permitted by the search warrant affidavit.457
One benefit of such an articulation of reasons for action is error correction. In
theory at least, transparency and accountability-favorite topics of much recent
criminal procedure academic literature-promote error correction.458 Third
parties, such as a judge, may find an officer's statement of reasons inadequate,
thus, for example, denying a search warrant. Such denial is not final but gives
police an incentive to investigate further, then file a new, better-justified warrant
application.459 In other instances, such as suppression hearing review of a
previously conducted stop allegedly based upon reasonable suspicion, further
455 See generally WALKER, supra note 218 (describing various police accountability
mechanisms and audiences at book length); HARRIS, supra note 275 (similar); Marc L. Miller &
Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REv. 125, 137-41 (2008) (discussing prosecutor's
relationship with the police concerning the exclusionary rule).
456 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 237 (discussing and illustrating the affidavit
requirement and its meaning).
457 See id. at 236-37; HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 356, 379-89 (2006) (explaining and excerpting a transcript from a
suppression hearing).
458 See generally Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1107 (2000).
459 Alternatively, it may merely encourage police to engage in "judge shopping," looking for
another judge who will rubber-stamp almost any warrant application. If there are such judges, that
may undermine proper incentive structures. On the other hand, even if judges vary in how strict a
test they set for issuing a search warrant, as long as all judges adhere to at least some mnimum
standard beyond automatic approval, there is at least some modest incentive for police to explain the
bases for their warrant request with some measure of detail. See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T.
Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search
Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REv. 221, 223, 260-61 (2000) (discussing judge shopping by police
seeking warrant approval).
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investigation is not an option. But error correction is still possible in the sense that
the constitutional wrong done is redressed.460
Transparency and accountability also promote error-reduction. Officers'
merely anticipating that evidence found during unjustifiable searches will be
suppressed may prompt those officers to do sufficient investigation to avoid
suppression in the first place. 46 ' Even without a suppression remedy, officers'
knowing that they need a prosecutor's approval or will face a superior's review
may encourage compliance.462 This supposition turns, of course, on officers
having reason to believe that they will in practice face professional sanctions, or at
least reputational injury, if their explanations for their actions fall short.463
Suppression also may create an incentive for more responsible action in the
future. Such action may include improved training programs to give officers the
tools to do better.4 64 Whether, as an empirical matter, suppression does deter is
subject to dispute.465 Yet recent evidence arguably suggests at least some modest
deterrent effect.466
Whether existing remedies are adequate or better ones can be designed is not,
however, central to my point here. The key is that a requirement of articulating
objectively stated reasons is a prerequisite to any remedy.467 If police are not
460 See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 613-22 (discussing status quo ante and similar
justifications for the exclusionary rule as a means of error correction and redress for constitutional
wrongs).
461 This is, in any event, the deterrence theory that the Court insists is the major justification
for the exclusionary rule, see id. at 615-16, though authors disagree on whether, and the degree to
which, empirical data demonstrate the effectiveness of this justification. Compare SAMUEL WALKER,
TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 9, 11, 15, 45-
46, 49-50 (1993) (arguing that there is evidence of at least a modest but important deterrent effect)
with Slobogin, supra note 128, at 365 (arguing the rule has not had a significant deterrent effect).
462 See Miller & Wright, supra note 455, at 137-41.
463 Christopher Slobogin suggests that under the current exclusionary rule regime police face
no real risk of either sort of injury nor of a monetary penalty. Slobogin, supra note 128, at 365-90.
Accordingly, Slobogin recommends replacing the exclusionary rule with a system of liquidated
damages or penalties and a beefed-up internal disciplinary process. See id. at 386-406.
46 WALKER, supra note 461, at 49-50 (arguing that departmental training programs are indeed
the primary way that the exclusionary rule deters police error).
465 Compare id. at 9, 11, 15, 45-46, 49-50 (concluding that there is deterrence) with Slobogin,
supra note 128, at 363-71 (concluding the opposite).
466 WALKER, supra note 461, at 49-50.
467 Thus, if deterrence is inadequate, the fault may lie in the remedy, but not in the justification
requirement. For example, even under an alternative remedial regime, whether an officer acted
negligently, grossly negligently, recklessly, or intentionally would seem relevant to the degree of the
penalty imposed upon the officer, see Slobogin, supra note 128, at 411, 420, and that would require
giving an officer a chance to explain her actions. Moreover, what occurred must be recreated, and, at
least for now, that requires officer explanation. Even if technological advances eventually make
videotaping officer search and seizure activity routine, a tape does not necessarily "speak for itself,"
and an officer wanting to avoid a sanction will likely insist on an opportunity to explain. See
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required to articulate such reasons, their actions cannot be judged by any fair
standard. Error reduction, indeed error identification, becomes impossible.
Furthermore, empirical evidence in analogous areas suggests that police who know
that they must explain their actions to third parties will make fewer errors in the
first place, because a justification requirement appears to compensate significantly
for subconscious biases.46 3
Articulating justifications may also help limit police officer discretion. The
more detailed justifications police must offer, the less willing they should be to act
without good reason. A good-reason limitation necessarily constrains discretion.469
Some commentators believe that the Court currently requires too little by way of
officer explanation, despite rhetoric to the contrary.470 Consequently, officer
discretion is, under this view, broader than is wise.
Indeed, in practice, officers feel comfortable finding suspicion in a wide array
of common behaviors by the law-abiding. Police are taught, for example, that
making a call while facing the wall at a public phone is a suspicious activity.47'
Yet there may be a host of reasons, such as calling a lover, apologizing to a friend,
or admitting to foolish behavior, for seeking some measure of privacy when
making a phone call in public. Police also consider perfect driving, driver-
slouching, perfect use of turn signals, and stretching one's neck to see in the
rearview mirror as "suspicious" driving behaviors.472 I routinely engage in all but
the first of these behaviors whenever I drive. I engage in the first, perfect driving,
admittedly only when I fear police are nearby but that is only because I sometimes
speed a bit, not that I am hiding some more serious crime. The point is not that
these behaviors should be irrelevant to police, but rather that allowing too heavy an
emphasis on behaviors common among honest folk or that these behaviors are too
subjective (when is someone "slouching" rather than simply not sitting "ramrod
straight"?) enormously expand police discretion. Those thinkers who see limiting
discretion as the Fourth Amendment's primary goal will not be pleased with the
result.473
Undue police discretion also risks a conformist society. As some former
officers admit, nonconformity is, in effect, now punished by arrest.4 74 Police find
KTVU.com, San Jose Police Trying Video Camera Headsets (Dec. 19, 2009, 4:05 PM),
http://www.ktvu.com/news/22016221/detail.html.
468 See supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
469 See STEvEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH (1992) (articulating a book-length
justification for this and related points).
470 See generally Harris, supra note 211, at 975-76 (crafting an extended argument that,
despite Terry's requirement that officers identify "articulable" bases to permit robust judicial review
of their discretion, lower courts generally merely defer to highly generalized police judgments).
471 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 150.
472 Id. at 224-25.
473 See Maclin, supra note 55, at 233-35.
474 See CARSON & DENHAM, supra note 26, at 84-100, 108, 153.
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suspicion in bad manners; "low social backup" (few identifiable family or friends);
the "urban outdoor lifestyle" of spending lots of time on the street-a lifestyle that
may result from poverty or cultural factors; and having a "bizarre" appearance,
including long dreadlocks, "strange" topknots, shaved heads, scruffy beards, or
tattooed forearms.475 Police may also be drawn to heavy accents, persons seeming
to live in the moment, profanity, transvestite clothing, "outrageous T-shirts," and a
"hoodlum strut."476 Again, these observations do not mean that dress or "lifestyle"
behaviors are irrelevant. Jail tattoos, gang colors, and mini-skirt-wearing by
women holding many condoms are all reasons to raise officer suspicion, though
perhaps insufficient in themselves to justify many officer actions. But to the extent
that officers can articulate as primary or major reasons for action a suspect's
engaging in majoritarian "values[-]affront[ing]" behaviors or a dissident lifestyle,
officer action encourages a uniformity of values and behavior antithetical to the
spirit, if not necessarily the letter, of First and Fourth Amendment values.477 A
reasons-articulation requirement can be one helpful tool in deterring that outcome.
Moreover, if courts and other legal actors take seriously the individualized
suspicion requirement, police must identify reasons for action specific to this case
rather than relying solely on mere generalities.478 That focus at its best can require
police to think hard before acting and encourage showing respect to a suspect as an
individual, while avoiding showing disrespect for salient social groups by treating
the individual as suspicious merely because of his membership in that group (as
occurs in racial profiling). 47 9 Relatedly, the sense of being judged as an individual
is central to the perhaps innately human, perhaps culturally instilled, American
sense of fairness.480 Yet public perceptions of fair treatment of individuals and
groups by officers increase overall obedience to law and willingness to cooperate
with the police.481
In sum, the reasons-articulation requirement is one helpful strategy in error
reduction, crime control, and enhancing law enforcement effectiveness and
legitimacy, though articulating reasons for action will not alone achieve these
goals. Moreover, at least sometimes, the articulation requirement contributes to a
police duty to investigate. It is this last point to which I next turn.
47 Id at 84-88.
476 Id at 91-95, 108-12, 153-54.
477 See id. at 95 (discussing "values-affronting" lifestyles); TASLITZ, supra note 19, at 56-67,
301-02 (discussing the close connection between the First and Fourth Amendments); Andrew E.
Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human
Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 158-69 (2002) (discussing how policing can serve to
punish values-affronting lifestyles, such as open displays of homosexual behavior during the 1960s).
478 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 6-9).
479 See id. (manuscript at 58-65).
480 See id. (manuscript at 65-70).
481 See id. (manuscript at 41-58).
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IV. THE DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE, EVALUATE, AND REPORT
A. The Duty to Investigate
1. The Nature of the Duty
The duty to investigate merits special attention. One commentator
summarized the nature of this duty concisely:
The extent of an officer's duty to investigate is incorporated into the
probable cause analysis. Courts generally have not imposed a stringent
duty to investigate upon the police; rather, they frequently describe the
duty to investigate as a duty to be reasonable. The duty to investigate
depends on the circumstances of the particular case . . . . The duty to
investigate is defined by the strength or weakness of probable cause
evidence. The existence of a "strong basis" for probable cause will
eliminate the need for further investigation. However, weak probable
cause evidence necessitates further investigation.482
As this writer makes plain, the duty is to investigate evidence sufficient to
individualize suspicion, that is, to link suspicion to a particular person or place.483
Courts recognize this duty in a number of cases involving probable cause,
including suppression motions in criminal cases and civil damages actions.484
Reasonable investigation need not, of course, be sufficient to prove the case
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. 485 Nor must it routinely exclude all defenses,
such as an alibi.486 Nevertheless, to say that the duty is one of "reasonableness" is
not to render it meaningless.487 Thus, some courts describe the duty as to
482 Jessica Ward, Note, Do the Clothes Make the Man? Implications of a Witness' Status in the
Determination ofProbable Cause, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2005, 2009-10 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
483 See id. at 2009-12 (focusing on adequacy of proof that "the suspect" committed the crime).
484 See id. at 2009-28 (summarizing civil damages actions and criminal suppression motion
cases).
485 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 1-9) (summarizing the quantitative proof
requirements for probable cause).
486 See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that officer had
probable cause despite failing to investigate the suspect's alibi claim because the officer's belief that
all such witnesses would lie to protect the suspect was reasonable); cf Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797
F.2d 432, 442 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that police are not required to "follow the best recommended
practices" because what is "wise" is not the same as what is "compulsory" under the Fourth
Amendment; indeed, "[t]o collapse those two concepts is to put the judicial branch in general
superintendence of the daily operation of government, which neither the [F]ourth [A]mendment nor
any other part of the Constitution contemplates").
487 See Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 791 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that routine probable cause
analysis requires the officer to weigh the inculpatory versus the exculpatory evidence against
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"properly investigate,"488 others as the duty to be "thorough."48 9 Though the duty
is rooted in the Fourth Amendment, some courts have added an additional Due
Process duty to investigate where police have independent knowledge suggesting
the suspect's innocence, independent, that is, from the suspect's mere claim that he
is innocent of the crime.490
Some courts likewise appear to vary the duty to investigate with the degree of
intrusion involved. The duty is arguably strongest when police make an arrest.4 91
In such cases, some courts require police at least to "investigate basic evidence,'A92
for example, looking for fingerprints on a readily available surveillance video
recording a robbery,493 and must "reasonably interview witnesses readily available
at the [crime] scene."494
Walker v. Spiller,4 95 a false arrest case based upon a claim of a lack of
probable cause for the arrest, illustrates the duty to investigate. There, the trial
someone without ignoring either); Ward, supra note 482, at 2012 ("Police determination of witness
credibility plays a prominent role in probable cause analysis.").
488 Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 1982); but see Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 146 (1979) (police need not conduct an "error-free investigation" of an innocence claim).
489 See Moore v. Marketplace Rest., Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1346 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is
incumbent upon law enforcement officials to make a thorough investigation and exercise reasonable
judgment before invoking the awesome power of arrest and detention.").
490 See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145 (concluding that failing to investigate an innocence claim where
time permits would violate due process); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding
that an officer's detaining someone whom the officer knows is innocent may violate 42 U.S.C. §
1983); Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding, however, no duty to
investigate a suspect's claim of innocence first raised at the time of her arrest because any contrary
rule would mandate release every time an arrestee denied her guilt).
491 See Brown v. Byer, 870 F.2d 975, 981 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[I]nvestigation must yield
objective circumstances justifying a good faith belief that there exists lawful authority to incarcerate
the prisoner.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 974 (7th
Cir. 1994) (describing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.
1992), as suggesting that "detention without investigation could be unconstitutional").
492 See Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475-77 (10th Cir. 1995) (declaring that the failure to so
investigate violates the Fourth Amendment).
493 Clipper v. Takoma Park, 876 F.2d 17, 19-20 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding probable cause
lacking where police failed to view prints taken from a surveillance film of the alleged robbery).
494 Romero, 45 F.3d at 1476.
495 No. 97-6720, 1998 WL 306540, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1998). The original Walker trial
judge's reconsideration decision not to dismiss the case was never overruled. However, a year later,
in 1999, a new trial judge in the case determined that the failure to investigate the alibi was not error
and did not negate the existence of probable cause; thus, that trial judge granted summary judgment
for the defendants as to most counts of the complaint. See Walker v. Spiller, 54 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423
(E.D. Pa. 1999). This latter court reasoned that there is generally no duty to check an alibi; that
probable cause was established by reliable eyewitness testimony; and that Walker had already been in
custody, so there was no further infringement on his liberty. Id. at 424-27. I cite the first Walker
opinion not for its precedential value but rather as an example of a court recognizing a very robust
duty to investigate under some circumstances as an aspect of probable cause. That there is some duty
to investigate seems logically undeniable, regardless of what any particular case holds, in that there
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judge, upon reconsideration, vacated her original grant of summary judgment to
the defense.496 The judge based her reconsideration order on the grounds that a
jury could reasonably decide that police failed to adequately investigate evidence
that could establish probable cause.49 Although police ordinarily have no Fourth
Amendment duty to investigate alibi claims, the trial court found that such a duty
was plausible in the case before it because of the otherwise weak evidence of
probable cause.498 Specifically, Walker was linked to a robbery by the confession
of another person-a confession discovered, however, to be false.499 Police
claimed that they knew Walker had been involved in a series of other robberies,
but the record before the court left it unclear whether the evidence of that link
rested on anything more than the investigating detective's own intuition.500 Police
also relied on a photo identification of Walker by the victim without offering any
reason to believe that the photographic identification was reliable.50 ' Given such
are some situations where probable cause is lacking. The only way to establish probable cause in
such instances is to do further investigation in the hope of uncovering additional evidence that will
establish probable cause. Nevertheless, as I will discuss further below, there is one recent United
States Supreme Court case that could be read broadly to reject any duty to investigate, or at least any
serious one. I argue here that, if so read, that is a mistake. See also Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646,
651 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably
thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances
and so long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts
before seeking to arrest).
496 Walker, 1998 WL 306540, at *7.
497 Id. at *6.
498 id
499 Id. at *5.
o Id
501 Given this otherwise weak evidence of probable cause, the court also found relevant
Walker's sworn allegations that his own confession at the time of his arrest was coerced by verbal
abuse, see Walker v. Spiller, 54 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1999), foreshadowing later innocence
movement concerns about the trustworthiness of uncorroborated confessions. See generally National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Electronic Recordation of Custodial
Interrogations Act, with Prefatory Note and Comments (Post-Style Interim Draft Nov. 2009)
(collecting and analyzing tentative recommendations to record the entire custodial interrogation
process to serve numerous goals, including protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction);
RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 288-89 (2008) (arguing, as a
policy matter, for making significant corroboration a prerequisite to the admissibility of a
confession). The probable cause determination is, of course, not the time for the ultimate
determination of guilt or innocence, which is to be made by the jury at trial. But some modest duty
of care should still be required because arrests made under circumstances raising a risk of error can
join with later efforts, including tunnel vision, to result in a conviction of an innocent person based,
for example, upon a false confession or a lying informant. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 170, at 130-
33 (discussing false confessions); Taslitz, supra note 27, at 1097-99 (discussing lying or mistaken
informants). Richard Leo argues that the risk of false confessions is sufficiently great where there is
otherwise "flimsy" evidence of guilt that interrogation should only be permitted in the first place
where there is already probable cause to arrest based upon other evidence. See LEO, supra, at 307-
08.
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seemingly shaky evidence, the court concluded that a jury would be free to decide
that police failed to have probable cause to arrest, so further investigation was
required to justify suspicion of this individual.502
Perhaps the Walker court's concept of a duty to investigate was unusually
muscular. As mentioned earlier, however, courts sometimes create a duty to
investigate where there is reason to question an informant's credibility, a duty
which some commentators nevertheless consider too weak.503 The primary flaw in
such instances is that courts too readily rely on generalizations alone concerning
credibility, for example, that victims must be assumed credible if they are ordinary
citizens rather than criminals themselves, that private store guards must likewise be
presumed credible, and that employers are unlikely to lie.50 These may be helpful
guidelines, but they seem inadequate in the face of contradicting case-specific
evidence calling for further investigation if suspicion is truly to be individualized.
Although the reasonable suspicion standard of proof falls short of that for
probable cause, both standards require individualized judgments.505 Accordingly,
a similar duty to investigate should inhere in both standards, even if that
investigatory duty is somewhat lighter for reasonable suspicion than full-blown
probable cause.
2. Pringle's Challenge to the Duty to Investigate
On the other hand, one fair interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court's recent case, Maryland v. Pringle,o6 is that it has gutted any serious duty to
investigate carefully to establish substantial individualized suspicion.so7 In
Pringle, police stopped a car because the driver was speeding.0 s In addition to the
driver, the car contained a front-seat passenger, Pringle, and a rear-seat
passenger.09 When the driver opened the car's glove compartment to get his
registration, the officer noticed a large wad of bills inside, and the police asked for,
502 See Ward, supra note 482, at 2009-11 (articulating a similar reading of the Walker
opinion).
503 See id. at 2029-36 (arguing for ways to improve the duty to investigate, particularly by
rejecting category-based credibility rules in favor of truly individualized determinations in each case
of informant credibility). Too much investigation can sometimes cause its own cognitive problems.
See generally KLEIN, supra note 5. I do not address those problems here for two reasons: first, the
current problem is probably too little investigation; second, an even more muscular duty to
investigate is unlikely to require "too much" inquiry given the low legal standards for reasonable
suspicion and probable cause.
so4 See Ward, supra note 482, at 2014-39 (summarizing case law on categories of "credible"
versus "non-credible" witnesses supporting probable cause determinations).
505 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 5-12).
5 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
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and received, the driver's permission to search the car.5 0 The officer found $763
in the glove compartment and five plastic bags, each containing a "hit" of cocaine,
concealed behind an upraised backseat armrest.5 1' The officer threatened to arrest
all three persons unless someone confessed.1  No one did.5  Accordingly, the
officer arrested all three men, releasing two only when Pringle later confessed to
the crime.514
When the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court concluded
that there was probable cause to believe that any one or all three of the men in the
car exercised dominion and control over the drugs.1 In particular, while
purporting to pay homage to the individualized suspicion requirement and to reject
guilt by association, the Court relied primarily on a generality, namely, that "[t]he
quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an
enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the
potential to furnish evidence against him."516
But, of course, as leading Fourth Amendment specialist Wayne LaFave has
pointed out, the only person for whom there was arguably some individualized link
to the drugs was the driver and owner of the vehicle, Partlow.517 It was Partlow's
consent that authorized the officer's search of the car in the first place, and there is
far more reason to believe that Partlow had put the money in the glove
compartment. Absent evidence that Pringle actually saw that money, there is no
basis for concluding that he was aware of its presence simply because he was a
passenger in the seat nearest the glove compartment of a car that he neither owned
nor drove. Nor, given the concealed location of the cocaine behind an upraised
armrest in the backseat-where Pringle did not sit-was there reason to believe
that he was aware of the drug's presence.
Indeed, Maryland's own law-which defines the elements of the crime for
which police must have probable cause-expressly declares that the mere presence
of drugs in a car can alone support an inference of possession by the passengers
only if it is shown to have been open and visible to those passengers before the
time of the arrest.518 As LaFave further notes, evidence of such visibility was
entirely lacking, making it hard to see how there was any evidence linking Pringle
510 id
511 Id.
512 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 368 (2003).
513 Id. at 368-69.
514 Id. at 369.
515 Id. at 374.
16 Id. at 373.
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3,6(c), at 343 (4th ed. 2004).
58 Margaret Paris & Andrew E. Taslitz, Catering to the Constable: The Court's Latest Fourth
Amendment Cases Give the Nod to Police, 19 CRIM. JUST. 5, 5-6 (2004) (discussing the Court of
Appeals of Maryland's reading of Maryland criminal law).
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to the crime.? 9 Likewise, the generalization that only those in a common drug
enterprise will enter a car containing drugs together is hard to accept.520 Well-
known criminal procedure professor Tracey Maclin points out that this argument
rests on the flawed presumption that a car passenger will frequently be aware of its
accessible, rather than its visible, contents, "even if those contents are hidden from
view."52 But, argues Maclin, "[t]he innocent graduate student who is offered a
ride home by a friend or classmate after a late-night party will not search
underneath the seat, open the backseat armrest, or examine the glove compartment
before accepting the ride home." 52 2 Nor, continues Maclin, will "the office worker
who offers to drive two colleagues to a weekend beach house late on a Friday night
... demand the right to search the bags of his invitees before starting the trip."523
Justice Powell has, in another context, made a similar argument underscoring the
flaw in the Pringle majority's reasoning:
[T]here are countless situations in which individuals are invited as guests
into vehicles the contents of which they know nothing about, much less
have control over. Similarly, those who invite others into their
automobile do not generally search them to determine what they may
have on their person; nor do they insist that any handguns [or drugs] be
identified and placed within reach of the occupants of the automobile.
Indeed, handguns [and drugs] are particularly susceptible to concealment
and therefore are less likely than are other objects to be observed by
those in an automobile.524
That leaves one more piece of evidence: the sole investigative effort by the
officer to determine specifically who among the three men (multiple offenders
were possible) "possessed" the cocaine. That effort was the officer's insistence
that someone confess or he would arrest everyone. There are powerful Fourth and
Fifth Amendment arguments that a suspect cannot be compelled to confess or to
rat on friends on pain of arrest or other sanction. 52 5 Nevertheless, at least one
leading commentator has argued that the failure to respond to an officer's
questions may be at least one relevant factor, though not a determinative one, in
the individualized suspicion determination. 52 6  Yet even this commentator
519 LAFAVE, supra note 517, at § 3.6(c), at 344.
520 Paris & Taslitz, supra note 518, at 6.
521 Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case's New Notion of Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re
and the Fourth Amendment, 2003-2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 395, 426.
522 id.
523 Id.
524 County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 174 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
525 See Maclin, supra note 521, at 420-21.
526 See LAFAVE, supra note 517, at § 3.6(f), at 364.
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concedes that in Pringle such silence was the only evidence linking Pringle to the
crime and was woefully insufficient.527
The blatant weakness of an individualized reason to believe that Pringle was
jointly or singly involved in possessing or distributing the cocaine seems hard to
square with the unanimous nature of the decision and prior precedent. Professor
Maclin concludes that the Court must silently be departing from its frequent
insistence that there is only one standard for probable cause.5 28 Probable cause
now means either traditional probable cause or investigative probable cause, the
latter virtually eliminating any serious individualization requirement because that
might hinder police investigation.529 Maclin elaborates:
Pringle indicates that the justices view the probable cause test as
being sufficiently flexible to serve multiple purposes. Probable cause
serves the traditional function of setting the standard for identifying
which persons should be arrested in order to initiate the process of
prosecution. In this sense, probable cause is the standard used to
apprehend the guilty and those who should be charged with an offense.
Pringle did not involve this traditional function of probable cause.
Rather, Pringle involved a different aspect of probable cause. Pringle
demonstrates that the justices also view probable cause as a standard,
sufficiently elastic, to allow police to arrest and interrogate in order to
decide which persons to charge. Yet, on this view, probable cause is
broad enough to tolerate arrests that serve an investigative function.530
Continues Maclin, "it is not surprising that the Rehnquist Court would
perceive the probable cause standard as a tool to facilitate, rather than hinder,
police apprehension of multiple persons for purposes of interrogation." 53 1 Lest his
readers have any doubt about his point, Maclin flatly declares that "Pringle-while
paying lip service to individualized suspicion-effectively appears to have
denuded probable cause of any such requirement."5 3 2
Restated, the original duty imposed on police was to investigate for evidence
of individualized suspicion, and only if their investigation adequately revealed
such evidence could they arrest. But if Maclin's reading of Pringle is right, and if
it is not limited to its facts or to similar situations, probable cause no longer
mandates adequate investigation to establish individualized suspicion before arrest.
Rather, probable cause may now be proven based almost entirely on
527 Maclin, supra note 521, at 412-13, 421-22, 425, 430 (describing LaFave's views about
Pringle, including that, contrary to the Court's conclusion, police lacked individualized suspicion).
528 Id. at 433-36.
s29 Id. at 415, 433-36.
53o Id. at 435-36 (emphasis added).
s' Id. at 436.
532 Id. at 415.
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generalizations, creating no police duty whatsoever to first conduct a successful
search for individualizing evidence. However, probable cause as so defined by the
Court functions not to command, but to permit later investigation to link the
arrested individual to the crime. Under such a view, truly individualized suspicion
is, therefore, no longer part of the probable cause determination.
3. The Link Between the Duty to Investigate and the Individualized Suspicion
Mandate
This analysis of Pringle helps to demonstrate the nature of the traditional duty
to investigate and its inseparable link to the idea of individualized suspicion. If the
duty to investigate is no longer mandated (or is at least watered down) as a
prerequisite to justifying a search or seizure, substantial social costs are incurred.
Notably, the risks of aggressive investigative techniques pinning the crime on the
innocent, explained earlier, rise if the need for evidence corroborating police
hunches as to who did the crime is abandoned. 33 Similarly, even if innocent
persons are not convicted, many more of them might be stopped, arrested,
frightened, or humiliated based upon mere hunches, stereotypes, and
generalizations.534 Furthermore, if generalizations alone (or primarily) can suffice
to create probable cause for arrest, error rates will rise because there will be no
serious duty to investigate to make more informed decisions in ways that may
counteract the cognitive biases reviewed above.535 Moreover, generalizations are
far easier to come by than particularities, rendering any police obligation to explain
themselves in a way that enables transparency and accountability to the courts,
legislatures, and the people meaningless. 536  "Articulable bases" become rote,
readily repeatable phrases, rather than clear articulations of reasons for action in a
particular case, reasons and their supporting evidence specific enough to be subject
to serious critique and review.
Ultimately, I do not believe that Pringle will be read by the Court as broadly
as Maclin fears-that the duty to investigate to establish truly individualized
suspicion will continue to have some meat. However, Maclin has evidence on his
side. I have only blind, irrationally optimistic faith to support my ever-wobbling
belief.
5 See generally Taslitz, supra note 170 (explaining how aggressive police interrogation
techniques can endanger the innocent).
534 See Taslitz, supra note 13 (manuscript at 26-27).
s3s See id. (manuscript at 27-30).
536 See id (manuscript at 47-48).
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4. A Duty to Investigate Can Promote a Culture of Individualization Among
Various Criminal Justice System Institutional Actors
There are also cultural implications from weakening the duty to
investigate/individualization requirement. Accountability clearly comes most
often today from the mere prospect of a suppression hearing, even if actual
suppression rarely occurs.537  That fear, it has been well-documented, has also
encouraged serious law enforcement training programs on Fourth Amendment
mandates 53-programs arguably fostering a (perhaps flawed) police culture of
respect for the individual and for hesitancy about too readily invading that
individual's privacy, property, or locomotive rights.539
Recent empirical research suggests that there may be an even stronger
prosecutor culture sprouted by the seeds of the individualized suspicion/duty to
investigate pairing. Indeed, two well-respected legal scholars have gone so far as
to argue that there is an "executive" exclusionary rule. 54 0 By this they mean that
prosecutors, in a way too little acknowledged, often dismiss cases or choose not to
oppose suppression motions because, in their reading of the law, there was
insufficient proof of an individual's nexus to the crime.54 Partly, prosecutors are
likely so convinced that the evidence will be suppressed that they choose not to
waste the court's time.542
But prosecutors may also make these decisions based on other policy goals
that accept the wisdom of a serious pre-search-or-seizure duty to investigate for
individualized evidence of criminality. That may grow both from the prosecutorial
advantages that a more thoroughly and early investigated case creates at trial and
from prosecutors' sense of their duty to do justice as encompassing a duty to foster
constitutional ideals, not simply constitutional minima.5 43  Professors Marc L.
Miller and Ronald F. Wright put the point thus:
5 See supra text accompanying notes 455-61 (discussing the exclusionary rule's deterrent
effect arising from the mere threat of suppression). The combination of a duty to investigate with a
duty to explain, it is worth noting, thus implicitly also creates a "duty to evaluate" because officers
who collect data but fail to evaluate its weight properly will find the evidence they seize suppressed
should they evaluate the evidence poorly. This point seems straightforward and thus need not be
elaborated further.
s3 See WALKER, supra note 461, at 49-50.
5 See id.; Taslitz, supra note 345, at 292-93 (explaining the importance of local police
culture); see generally Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 Miss. L.J. 483 (2006) (arguing for a revamped
exclusionary rule focusing on promoting a police culture of respect for constitutional rights).
s4 Miller & Wright, supra note 455, at 137-41 (coining the term "executive exclusionary
rule" and summarizing the relevant social science).
541 Id. at 138-39.
542 See id. at 139-40.
$43 See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2006) ("The prosecutor in a criminal
case shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause. . . ."); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
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When the percentage of prosecutor exclusions climbs much higher
than judicial exclusions, however, it could reveal various other
prosecutor attitudes about the search-and-seizure rules. Prosecutors
could enforce search-and-seizure doctrine more stringently than judges in
selected areas to promote training of police officers on recurring problem
areas. Executive exclusion also might reflect something more than a
prediction about the judge's likely decision on a future motion to exclude
evidence: it could grow out of principled allegiance to constitutional
ideals that the prosecutor, like the judge, swears to uphold.5"
In addition to serving a sanctioning function, law serves a symbolic,
communicative function.545 Constitutional law sends particularly powerful
messages about how we, as a people, should "constitute" ourselves.5 4 6  Still,
individuals and groups, based upon a host of factors, may interpret those messages
differently. 54 7 If Professors Miller and Wright are correct, at least some, perhaps
many or even most, prosecutors see their ethical duty as aspiring to make real the
highest constitutional ideals embodied in the law rather than simply to convict
within the "rules of the game."548 But if the ideals themselves are diluted or
abandoned, the message heard by prosecutors may itself change, rendering the
"executive" exclusionary rule a mere shadow of its former self.
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause
to be instituted, permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient
admissible evidence to support a conviction."); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003
U. ILL. L. REv. 1573 (engaging in an extended exploration of the meaning of the prosecutor's duty to
do justice).
5" Miller & Wright, supra note 455, at 139; see id. at 137-41 (summarizing supporting
empirical data).
545 See Taslitz, supra note 306, at 409-13.
546 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecutorial Preconditions to Plea Negotiations: "Voluntary"
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 23 CRM. JUST. 14, 23-24 (2008).
547 See Taslitz, supra note 28, at 18-3 1; Taslitz, supra note 105, at 2271-82.
548 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607,
617 (1999) ("Criminal defense lawyers play close to the line. Prosecutors play in the center of the
court."). Former Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson put the point even
more eloquently:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as
those which mark a gentleman . . . . [T]he citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law
and not factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility.
Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Speech Delivered at the
Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'Y 18 (1940).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to lay out the cognitive obstacles to, and opportunities
for, police getting right the individualized suspicion judgment that is at the heart of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Perhaps this article's most important
points are that reviewing courts should demand serious, thorough explanations
from officers, who must justify their search and seizure decisions, and courts
should not also readily defer to conclusory assertions of police "intuition."
Although the justification requirement is already part of the legal landscape, this
article suggests that a more robust version of the requirement is often desirable.
That robust version must also take more seriously the command that what police
must justify is particularized, not generalized, suspicion. Cognitive science thus
suggests that arguments for courts giving even more deference to police search and
seizure judgments than is currently true should be rejected.
Part of a more robust justification requirement, this article has also
maintained, should be judicial imposition of a more vigorous police duty to
investigate more thoroughly where time allows. But the courts alone cannot cure
all the ills of officer cognition, nor fully take advantage of its strengths. Rather,
the police must improve their training methods and operating practices to take
advantage of police experience without the distorting effects of police biases.
None of these suggestions calls into question the good faith, hard work, and
persistence of committed officers in protecting public safety. Instead, these
suggestions stem from the reality that all humans have cognitive strengths and
weaknesses, and police are, after all, just people too.
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